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ABSTRACT 
 
 The conception of René Descartes as the arch-rationalist has been sufficiently 
exploded in recent literature; however, there is still a large lacuna in our understanding 
of how empirical research and experimentation fits within his philosophy. My 
dissertation is directed at addressing just this problem. I contend that Descartes’ famed 
method is not a singular monolith but instead two interdependent methods: one 
directed at metaphysical and epistemological truth, while the other directed at empirical 
questions and contingent facts of the world. I claim there is evidence for this position 
not only in his actual scientific practice, but also in the rhetorical structure of 
the Discourse on Method and the Principles of Philosophy. In exploring the empirical 
side of Descartes’ method, I show how his unusual system produces a system of 
experiment designed to serve both as a discovery and verification tool at the same time. 
  As a further application of my interpretation, I argue that the Passions of the 
Soul and Descartes’ ethical theory expressed in his correspondence must also be seen as 
part of his two-fold methodology. Instead of attempting to cast Descartes as a virtue 
ethicist or deontologist, as is normally done, I emphasize that Descartes’ ethics is 
centered on the mind-body union, and therefore, includes an empirical element as well. 
The end result is an ethics that requires a detailed study of mechanics, anatomy, physics, 
as well as medicine. 
  
vi 
 
 Lastly, I show how this methodology can help us understand the works of some of 
his early followers: Claude Gadroys and Jacques Rohault. Both of these philosophers not 
only serve to ground my interpretation, but also to highlight aspects of Cartesian that 
have often been passed over. I show how the experimentalism of Jacques Rohault goes 
beyond the epistemological boundaries set up by Descartes, as signifies a new direction 
that will ultimately eclipse the Cartesian school of thought. In the case of Claude 
Gadroys, I present a concrete example of the exploitation of the over generality of 
Cartesian principles. In so doing, I show that while Descartes’ experimentalism was 
intended to rule out the possibility of occult causes, he in fact created a system that 
allowed for them, only under a different guise. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE TWO METHODS OF THE DISCOURSE ON METHOD 
The Discourse on Method, first published in 1637 and accompanied by three 
essays: the Dioptrics, Meteors, and Geometry, propelled Descartes to the center of 
philosophical and scientific communities of his day. The importance of these documents 
to understanding Descartes’ overarching project cannot be overstated. However, what 
Descartes actual method is, despite the title of the work, is a surprisingly contentious 
subject of debate. To untangle the puzzle the Discourse and its Essays presents 
regarding Descartes’ method, I first propose to look at the historical context 
surrounding these documents with the idea that this context will shed some light on 
Descartes’ original intentions for the project. Later, I will look to the Essays themselves 
to see how much of his famed method can actually be distilled from the mash of 
observations, experiments, and philosophy that comprises the three essays. Ultimately, 
my goal is to show that in the Discourse Descartes adopts two distinct methods, 
conceived as methods to discover every truth about nature and ourselves, and that once 
these two methods are exposed we will be able to see how they are connected to the 
Essays as well as Descartes’ later work.1 
 
                                                   
1 Daniel Garber (2001), however, claims that Descartes abandons his method rather 
early on. As we will see, there is not enough evidence for this position, and even Garber 
has since moved away from the claim. Clarke (2006, p. 90) also believes that Descartes 
had broadly abandoned any serious commitment to a method after the Rules. 
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I. A Brief Note on Methodology 
John Schuster rightly points out that there is an inherent problem in discussing 
Descartes' method from our contemporary perspective.2 On the one hand, given the 
work of Kuhn, Koyré, Feyerabend, and the like, there seems to be a justified skepticism 
regarding the efficacy of method and whether it can truly guide practice. However, on 
the other hand, many scholars, along with Descartes’ early followers, took the Cartesian 
claim to a universal method as genuine—that is to say, they understood it as a method 
that in fact directly led to some of Descartes’ greatest discoveries. From all outward 
signs, Descartes’ himself seemed to very much believe in the efficacy of his own method, 
which should come as no surprise. Swayed by Descartes’ own rhetoric, many scholars 
have attempted to explain exactly how Descartes’ method did in fact result in specific 
practice and discoveries of everything from the anaclastic line to the Meditations on 
First Philosophy.3 Schuster’s question then is how could so many people have believed 
and attempted to follow something that could not possibly have worked in actual 
scientific practice? His solution is to consider Descartes’ claims regarding his method as 
nothing more than literary devices— “mythic speech,” as Schuster puts it. This point is 
well taken. It seems silly to try to retrace Descartes’ steps in any of his discoveries by 
recreating his method. However, his (and his followers’) belief in the method is not 
something that can be readily discarded without doing a serious disservice to the history 
of philosophy. Thus, as a compromise, while it would be a fool’s errand to extrapolate 
how the method actually resulted in the great claims made by Descartes, we can 
nevertheless consider his method as a mode of presentation. As a mode of presentation 
                                                   
2 Schuster (1983, p. 33-40) and again in (1993). 
3 See Garber (2001, p. 36-37), and Flage and Bonnen (1999) respectively. 
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we can see how Descartes allowed his conception of method to unfold throughout his 
texts and how the structure of them is meant to mirror what he claims to be his method. 
At the same time, we avoid taking the overly simplistic method explicitly formulated by 
Descartes as actually exclusively dictating his practice, where the alternative would miss 
out on the massive amounts of complexity and ingenuity that do not neatly fall within 
the restrictive bounds of his method. 
In treating Descartes’ method as merely a mode of presentation, even though he 
believed it to be a method of discovery, we can, as it were, have our cake and eat it too. 
We can account for Descartes’ sincere belief in the efficacy of his method and explain 
behavior based on this belief (i.e. the structure of his works, his writing style, etc.). 
Further, it helps emphasize that while his ideas are supposed to result from the method, 
they actually do not, which will also help explain some interpretive problems that will be 
discussed later on. Indeed, there has been a general tendency to force every Cartesian 
discovery into the mold presented either in the rules of the Rules for the Direction of the 
Mind or the four rules of part II of the Discourse on Method. My position is that such 
readings can certainly be given for any Cartesian argument or discovery, but this should 
not be seen as confirmation of that reading. The basic problem is that either the richness 
of scientific practice very quickly exceeds the bounds placed upon it by any method, and 
we are left trying to shoehorn in an oversized engine into an economy car, or we 
interpret the method in such a general manner that it can account for any practice at all. 
In either case, overly emphasizing a method as an explanatory tool will fall short—in the 
first case, because it is being over extended to apply to areas where it should not, and in 
the second, because it becomes unfalsifiable, and thus lacks real content. That being 
said, Descartes’ method is no exception, and I believe no scholar would deny that, 
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whatever is taken to be Descartes’ method, it has no shortage of vagueness—indeed, this 
goes a long way toward reinforcing Schuster point. Where Schuster and I disagree is on 
the core of Descartes’ “method discourse”4 and how it connects to his later works, all of 
which will come to the fore later on in the essay. To begin, we should examine some of 
the history behind the Discourse to first pin down exactly how and why he chose to 
frame his method in the way that he did, and how grasping this particular strategy can 
help us further understand subsequent works. 
II. The Genesis of the Discourse 
 The Discourse, as a historical text, is incredibly rich. For one, it is tied in with the 
development of Descartes’ thought; as such, it bears relation to both one of his earliest 
philosophic works, the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, and his most important later 
works, the Meditations and the Principles. In this way we can see the Discourse as an 
intermediary work, which serves as a bridge to connect the early period of Descartes 
work to the later. Secondly, the Discourse and the three essays published with it also 
represent a formative moment in Descartes’ publishing and rhetorical strategies. As is 
well known, upon learning the misfortune that befell Galileo after publishing his own 
works, Descartes made what he believed to be the prudent decision and self-censured 
one of his earliest and most ambitious projects, the World. 5 Unsatisfied with idleness 
brought about from his self-imposed prohibition on publishing, and pressured by his 
                                                   
4 Schuster believes that the core of Descartes method is to be found through an analysis 
of the Rules and part II of the Discourse on Method (Shuster, 1986, p. 40-47) and again 
in (1993, p. 200-201). 
5 Descartes discusses his fear of Galileo’s plight in a series of letters to Mersenne dated, 
November 1633 (AT, I: 269), February 1634? (AT, I: 285), and May 1634 (AT, I: 287). It 
is quite interesting that in the last of these letters Descartes explicitly address how even 
the hypothetical nature of Galileo’s work could not save him from condemnation. He 
further asks for clarification on Galileo’s situation in letters to Mersenne dated 15 May 
1634 (AT, I: 292), and 14 August 1634 (AT, I: 303).  
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ideas circulating in a diluted or corrupted form,6 he creates the Discourse as a way to 
reveal his ideas to the world while, at the same time, insuring his safety and leisure in 
his cherished “desert.”7 Keeping in mind Descartes’ prudence, it is just as important to 
take into account what is in the work as well as what is left out. As I will show later on, 
Descartes intentionally leaves out parts of his method, which in turn has led to many 
interpretive problems. 
Even the publication history of the Discourse is rich. Through Descartes’ 
correspondence an incredibly detailed picture of the hurdles he faced in publishing 
comes to light: finding a publishing house, securing the royal permission to publish, and 
even hiring a suitable artisan to create the illustrations are all discussed in varying levels 
of detail throughout the early correspondence. 
 It is important to note that, as well as serving to disseminate Descartes’ thought, 
the Discourse served an important role for Descartes’ own self-promotion and the 
seemingly timeless search for patronage. Paradoxically, however, running directly 
contrary to this purpose is Descartes’ indefatigable intention to remain anonymous. 
While engaged in the lengthy process of acquiring a royal license to publish from 
France, which would secure the work against counterfeiters, problems arose due to his 
unwillingness to be publically associated with the work.8 However, much to Descartes’ 
chagrin, Mersenne openly divulged his name and allows it to appear in an early version 
of the royal license, which would have been appended at the end of the book.9 
Eventually, Descartes’ protestations gained traction and the first edition of the 
                                                   
6 At least this is how Descartes portrays the situation in part VI of the Discourse. 
7 Descartes often referred to his home in the Netherlands as a desert to highlight the 
solitude and lack of distractions compared to Paris. 
8 Descartes to Huygens, 3 March 1637 (AT, I: 622). 
9 AT, I: 396. 
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Discourse only mentions “the author” but nowhere the author’s name. Despite all this, 
he was fairly insistent to ensure, with no apparent attention to keeping his solitude, that 
the Discourse found its way into the hands of more than a few important figures.10 In 
this vein, as a tool for the promotion and promulgation of his work, the Discourse 
served a twofold purpose. First, Descartes planned to collect objections to the Discourse 
and its three essays and publish responses publically—thus, the initial publication of the 
Discourse and Essays was only to be a first step toward a complete work.11 Second, 
Descartes saw the work as paving the way for his more ambitious treatise The World, 
insofar as he hoped it would drum up sufficient demand for his works to assuage his fear 
of persecution or censure.12 The Discourse must be seen as a bellwether, as it is only 
intended to reveal enough of Descartes’ views to entice the reader to demand more. In 
this regard, if his hopeful view turned out to be misguided, Descartes’ strong insistence 
on anonymity would certainly have proved invaluable. 
 However, even given this brief snapshot of the nuanced context that helps situate 
and anchor this unique document, along with Descartes’ intentions, it still poses itself, 
philosophically, as a cryptic jigsaw puzzle of seemingly unrelated parts. Perhaps the 
most important interpretative difficulty is found in the murky relationship of the 
Discourse itself with the three essays that accompany it: the Dioptrics, Meteors, and 
Geometry. Like most of Descartes’ works, the Discourse and Essays were not completed 
                                                   
10 Descartes initially wanted to be given at least 200 copies from the publisher for him to 
distribute to whom he saw fit (Letter to Mersenne, March 1637 (AT, I: 339)). The 
recipients of the discourse are wide ranging from the Stadholder, Frederik-Hendrik, to 
the wives of Constantijn Huygens and David le Leu de Wilhem. 
11 This plan, of course, does not go nearly as smoothly as Descartes had hoped. Many 
authors who write in refuse to agree to allow their objections to be published, while 
others are criticized by Descartes for lacking in quality. Surely this experience led to the 
more managed approach taken to the objections and replies of the Meditations. 
12 Letter to Cerizy(?), May 1637 (AT, I: 369). 
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in one sitting, but were worked on in fragments, taken up and set down at various times, 
and pieced together at the very last moment. I will show that understanding the stages 
of the development of the Discourse and Essays is one of the most important clues to 
understanding the method that is supposed to be revealed therein.  
When we begin to look at the composition of the Discourse apart from its Essays, 
it quickly becomes obvious that it was not as prominently featured in Descartes’ plans as 
it has been in the historical reception of it. Indeed, as is revealed in his correspondence, 
the Discourse itself seems to have been merely an afterthought. Through the 
correspondence we can track much of Descartes’ work on the Essays well before any 
mention of the Discourse itself. In a letter from the summer of 1635, we learn that 
Descartes has separated the Dioptrics from the World and he plans to publish it as a 
standalone treatise.13 Shortly thereafter, still in 1635, Descartes announces his plans to 
attach Meteors to the Dioptrics and first mentions a preface planned to be attached to 
the two works—it is commonly held that this preface will eventually become the 
Discourse.14 In March of 1637 Descartes writes to Mersenne to tell him that the 
Discourse, no longer merely a preface, and the Geometry, which he was still working on 
through 1637,15 will now be included, which brings us to the final four treatises we know 
today.16 However, when Descartes sends his works to be reviewed for consideration for a 
Royal license to publish, he sends only the three essays and not the Discourse itself; 
                                                   
13 Descartes to Mersenne (AT, I: 322). 
14 Descartes to Huygens, 1 November 1635 (AT, I: 591). We can pinpoint the exact 
starting point of the Meteors to be the 5th of February, from a letter he wrote to Chanut 
on March 6th 1646 (AT IV, 376). 
15 In a letter to an unknown correspondent Descartes says of his Geometry, “It is a 
treatise that I partially wrote while my Meteors was being printed, and I even came up 
with a section during this time” (AT, I: 458, my translation) 
16 AT, I: 339. 
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whether it is because the work is not yet finished or Descartes did not deem it important 
enough to send is unclear.17  
 In the constant flux of additions and changes, even the title of the Discourse 
experienced its own unique genesis and offers an interesting insight into Descartes’ 
thoughts on the role of the text in relation to the three essays. The first mention of a 
possible title comes in March of 1636 as The Project of a Universal Science that can 
Elevate our Nature to its Highest Degree of Perfection. The Dioptrics, Meteors, and 
Geometry also have a subtitle attached to them that claimed each to be a work in which 
the most curious Matters that the Author could have chosen to serve as proof of the 
universal Science he proposes are explained in such a way that even those that have 
never studied can understand them.18 Later in a letter to Huygens, who suggests a 
change to the current title of the Discourse, Descartes adamantly defends his choice of 
the word ‘discourse’: “I said ‘Discourse on Method’, instead of putting simply, ‘Dioptrics’ 
and ‘Meteors’, because I undertook to include there everything that regarded my 
subject.”19 The title of the work becomes a sticking point for Descartes, who had already 
defended it once to Mersenne: 
But I did not know how to understand very well your objection regarding the title 
as I did not use Treatise on Method but instead Discourse on Method, which is 
the same as Preface or Notice concerning Method, to show that I had no plan to 
teach the method but only to discuss it. As one can see from what I say in it, it 
consists more in practice than in theory, and I name the following treatises 
Essays in this Method because I claim the things they contain could not be 
                                                   
17 Mersenne to Descartes, 15 February 1636 (AT, I: 659). 
18 AT, I: 339. 
19 27 February 1637 (AT, I: 620). 
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discovered without the method, and that one can know its value through them. I 
have also inserted some things of metaphysics, physics, and medicine in the first 
discourse to show that the method extends to all kinds of subjects.20 
The main point is thus that the Discourse should not be interpreted as giving a 
completely rigorous system of demonstration or discovery, and that the title itself must 
reflect this.21 Taking Descartes at his word on this point, as we have no textual evidence 
that he ever claimed to have fully explicated his method or changed it, we must take 
seriously the limitations placed on discussing his method as presented in the Discourse. 
At the very most, we can only hope to find bits and pieces of it played out through 
examples and not compactly located in any one place. I would also like to note in the 
above passage, as we will be returning to it later, the emphasis placed here on practice 
above theory in the presentation of the method. 
III. The Method of the Essays 
Just how we should view the Discourse given the three essays that accompany it, 
and how, if at all, is the famed method proposed therein aligned with the essays? My 
own methodological claim is that given the historical circumstance outlined above, it 
seems reasonable to view the Discourse in light of the essays and not vice versa, as has 
commonly been done. One good reason for taking this position is that the Discourse, as 
Descartes himself had said, reveals only part of the method that is to be demonstrated in 
the essays, whereas the Essays are explained as exercises in that method. This, of 
course, presents a severe limitation on any possible interpretation of that method taking 
                                                   
20 April 1637 (AT, I: 348). 
21 Descartes again notes that he is only giving part of his actual method in a letter to 
Mersenne dated March 1636 (AT, I: 338), and he repeats this again in a Letter to 
Vatier(?) (AT I, 559).  
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mostly from the Discourse alone. Descartes even goes so far as to mention that the 
Discourse is "the least well-developed of the entire work."22 Further, the fact that the 
Discourse itself was written well after much of the work for both the Dioptrics and 
Meteors was completed again gives us some cause to believe that he wrote the Discourse 
to align with the essays and not the other way around. To expound upon this point, I 
propose looking first at the Discourse and then trying to find a connection to the essays. 
Then, in a very Cartesian fashion, I intend to reverse my analysis and move back from 
the essays to the Discourse, hoping that the fundamental questions surrounding the 
Discourse (e.g., what parts of Descartes' method are missing, and how the Discourse is 
supposed to relate to the Essays) will be clarified in the process. 
 As I have already mentioned, there is considerable scholarly disagreement about 
what Descartes’ method is, so it is no wonder that there has been some difficulty 
tracking the method through the Essays. The received view seems to be that when 
looking for Descartes' famed method we should look primarily in part II of the 
Discourse where he gives four general rules for his method.23 The first rule tells us to 
never accept anything as true that is not completely evident. The second is to divide 
problems into their simplest parts. The third is to order one's thoughts by the simplest 
and easiest to understand and to move little by little to the more complex. And finally, 
the last maxim is to make lists and summaries to make sure that nothing has been 
omitted regarding the problem at hand.24 Prima facie, there is good cause to believe that 
this vague and relatively terse set of prescriptions is the real meat of Descartes' 
                                                   
22 However, he does also claim that it is the most important (AT, I: 560). 
23 For a paradigmatic example of this see Daniel Garber’s essay, “Descartes and Method 
in 1637” in Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy Through Cartesian 
Science.  
24 AT, VI: 18-19. 
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methodology—part II is, after all, introduced by Descartes himself as, where we can find 
"the principal rules of the Method the Author had searched for."25 Apart from this most 
obvious bit of information, many commentators have sought to find evidence for 
establishing part II of the Discourse as Descartes’ method by tracing a line of continuity 
between it and his earlier work, the Rules.26  
The Rules went about establishing a set of rules that, when followed, would lead 
the mind toward new truths—a project very similar in tone to the full title of the 
Discourse. I take this, along with some similarities between specific rules in the two 
texts, to be the primary motivating force for looking toward the Rules to elucidate the 
method of the Discourse. For example, rules two and three in the Rules, which demand 
certain cognition, seem to correspond loosely to the first rule of the Discourse. Similarly, 
rules five and six, which deal with order and simplicity, broadly correspond to rules two 
and three of the Discourse.27 There are, however, significant differences between the two 
texts, which makes the connection a bit more difficult to discern. Most obviously, the 
Rules was originally intended to be comprised of three sets of twelve rules, of which only 
twenty-one rules were completed—none of which were ever published during Descartes' 
lifetime.28 If we are to find some constancy among these rules, we have to admit that 
Descartes had reconsidered the majority. By the time of the Discourse, he had shrunk 
his set of rules to a meager four painfully vague rules lacking in anything close to the 
                                                   
25 AT, VI: 1. 
26 See Beck (1952), Brissey (2013), Bonnen and Flage (1999), Dika (2015) and many 
more, as I take this to be a firmly established view. 
27 Garber (1992) and (2001, p. 35) finds the majority of Descartes’ method in rule 5 of 
the Rules. 
28 CSM I, pg. 7. 
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substantive detail presented in the Rules.29 Whether or not there is continuity between 
the Rules and part II of the Discourse I will leave open, as it is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. It is worth noting, however, that any connection would merely focus on a 
relatively small portion of the Rules and, might still be unable to explain the link 
between the Discourse and its Essays.30 Thus I would like to consider that the Rules 
might simply be a red herring, as Descartes’ views may have significantly changed in the 
long interval between his writing of the Rules and the Discourse.31 Further, without any 
correspondence regarding the connection to the Rules and his later projects, I feel it is 
best to establish an interpretation based on the Discourse and correspondence alone. 
 Relegating our understanding of the Descartes’ method to the Discourse does 
come with some problems of its own. One challenge that some commentators have 
encountered when taking part II to be the primary location of Descartes’ methodological 
commitments is to find this "method" played out in the Essays. On its face, it seems like 
this should be an easy task; after all, Descartes does claim explicitly that his Essays are 
an exercise in his method. However, when we look into the essays we find no mention of 
the four rules or their use. For the most part, problems presented in the three essays 
simply do not break problems down into their simplest parts, and instead of being 
ordered by simplicity, some are presented in a breathtakingly bizarre fashion—
                                                   
29 Whether or not these four rules actually bear some connection with the original 
project of the Rules is not important to the project of this essay. However, my impulse is 
to deny such a relation due to the lack of obvious resemblance in structure and detail, 
difference in number of rules and lack of any division of the rules. 
30 It would also be important to first establish when Descartes’ stopped working on the 
Rules. If he had not yet abandoned the project by the time of the Discourse, there would 
be good cause to look between the two for continuity. However, since there is no 
consensus on the matter, I find it best to search elsewhere. 
31 Although the dating of the Rules is still a hotly contested subject, but this lack of 
consensus itself is good reason to avoid substantially depending on the Rules in 
interpreting the Discourse. 
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sometimes involving analogies that are difficult to relate to the actual question being 
answered.32 What is even more troubling is that Descartes himself admits that what 
appears in his essays fails his very first rule: to admit nothing that is not certain. In part 
VI of the Discourse he explains, 
If some of the claims I spoke of, in the beginning of the Dioptrics and Meteors, 
shock at first because I name them suppositions...I named them suppositions 
only so one knows that I believe I can deduce them from these first truths that I 
have explained below, but I wanted specifically not to do this...33 
So, Descartes notes that because he is not starting with his first truths, his method was 
not precisely followed (but could be, should he take the time to write it out properly).34 
Let’s call this lack of correspondence between the four rules of part II and the Essays the 
methodological problem. 
IV. Isolating the “Method” 
Before considering my own solution to this problem, we should narrow our focus 
to locations where we can find examples of Descartes’ method in the most vibrant 
contrast. As a further constraint, we should remind ourselves that although we most 
certainly will not find something complete, it might stand to reason that we can find 
elements or a general outline of how Descartes believes his method should be followed 
                                                   
32 I am thinking specifically of Descartes' "proof" of Snell's law in the Dioptrics. 
Descartes uses the analogy of a man hitting a tennis ball against various surfaces and 
observing the results. This analogy is particularly difficult to understand that light is 
consider by Descartes to be a pressure and to move instantaneously, two qualities that 
are not at all exhibited in the tennis ball. The analogy between light and the behavior of 
tennis balls presents further difficulty as it is surely something that could be doubted, 
contra Rule I. 
33 AT, IV: 76. This is a claim that Descartes never follows through on and most likely 
abandons by the time of the Principles. 
34 Roger Ariew (2010) points out that this claim, while repeated several time in his 
correspondence, might be recognized by Descartes to be all but bluster. 
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in practice. Fortunately, Descartes’ correspondence gives us rather clear indications of 
where to begin our examination. Following Descartes’ advice to Vatier in February 1638, 
we should direct our attention to his description of the rainbow as the best place to see 
the method in action.35 
 In the opening paragraph of his discussion on the rainbow Descartes reiterates 
his emphasis on this example in claiming, he "would not know how to choose a subject 
better suited to show how, by the method [he] uses, one can come to knowledge that 
those whose writings we have did not have." 36 Yet, if we accept the four rules of part II 
as comprising the method, it is less than obvious how this concrete example could fit 
into the bounds or be guided by those rules. Descartes begins his discussion of the 
rainbow with a basic observation: rainbows are not formed exclusively in the sky, but 
also in fountains. From this simple point he moves on to generalize that rainbows only 
form when there are drops of water and light present. Descartes then moves further to a 
simple experiment involving filling a round flask with water and holding it at different 
angles in relation to the sun and his eye, all while carefully observing the artificial 
rainbows he produces. 37 After exhibiting several observational facts about the angles 
required for viewing color, Descartes forms several more questions and moves on to 
more complicated experiments involving prisms and eventually restricted prisms that 
only allow certain rays of light to pass.38 By the end of the discourse on the rainbow, 
Descartes produces several tables of data and can state the general conditions required 
                                                   
35 AT, I: 559. 
36 AT, VI: 325. 
37 AT, VI: 325. 
38 AT, VI: 330. 
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for viewing a rainbow, as well as some general claims about the nature of light, which 
assumes many of the things he had already proven in the Dioptrics.39 
 If we are to find any insight into Descartes’ method, the example of the rainbow 
should be where it is hiding. Daniel Garber makes an exceptionally well thought out 
attempt to align the four rules of the Discourse with this particular example of the 
rainbow. However, even Garber admits, “It is by no means obvious how this somewhat 
confused mass of experiment and reasoning can be fitted into the rather rigid mold of 
Descartes’ method.”40 At this point we might try to draw one of two conclusions: either 
there is something missing in the common interpretation of the role the Discourse fills, 
or Descartes wrote a piece to be connected to the three essays that actually bears no 
relation to them, despite explicitly claiming that there is such a relation. This latter 
option cannot be completely ruled out immediately, though attempting to give a 
charitable interpretation to Descartes, one hopes it proves false. It is certainly a distinct 
possibility that with the Discourse being Descartes’ first major published philosophic 
work, he did not fully understand his own method or had simply failed to express it 
adequately. Perhaps he was, as he often appears elsewhere, quite content to merely 
bluster and boast. All of these considerations feed nicely into Schuster’s characterization 
of the method as largely nothing more than rhetorical red meat. Thus, it is quite 
tempting to try explain away the methodological problem by claiming that the 
Discourse was simply an overly ambitious project that, when applied to the three essays, 
did not pan out as he had hoped—or perhaps never could have. However, this seems 
                                                   
39 Laura Georgescu and Mădălina Giurgea (2012) argue that Descartes’ experimental 
method is not used to test prediction but is more a method of discovery, however, as will 
become clear later on, I believe this cannot be the case. Cf. Sakellariadis (1982). 
40 Garber (2001, p. 99). 
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unlikely, in view of the fact that the essays were developed significantly before the 
Discourse was written, which would put Descartes’ in an ideal position to align his 
purported method with what he claims as an exercise in that method. Of course, there 
are other more elaborate ways to account for this apparent disconnect, but I would like 
to attempt a more charitable reading before resigning myself to accusing Descartes of 
gross incompetence or being forced into forging elaborate constructions. My basic 
contention is that Descartes must have had the Essays, at least the Meteors and 
Dioptrics, firmly in mind when composing the Discourse, so we should be able to find 
some connection between them, even if it is merely rhetorical.  
 To this end, I will take into account some facts about the Essays and then revisit 
the Discourse. But before following through with this, I would simply like to point out 
some general features of Descartes’ methodology, independent of the context of the 
Discourse. It has become increasingly clear thanks to a bevy of recent scholarship that 
Descartes was an avid experimenter and collector of observational data.41 However, this 
is not a particularly shocking discovery.42 In Descartes’ correspondence from the period 
before the publication of the Discourse we find dozens of references to experiments and 
observations from a wide variety of correspondents. The scope and purposes of these 
reports is quite broad; at one end, there are atmospheric and astronomical observations, 
at the other critical experiment-like scenarios being proposed and discussed regarding 
the speed of light. Of course, Descartes’ main source of these reports is Marin Mersenne, 
who was anxious to communicate and persistently question him regarding 
                                                   
41 This was also apparent to many of Descartes’ early followers who quickly tried to 
extend the Cartesian experimental program. See Roux (2013b). 
42 Excellent scholarship has been done on Descartes’ experiments from a very early 
stage, see Milhaud (1918) and Blake (1929a, 1929b). 
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observational/experimental data. Descartes’ love of experimentation was not at all a 
fleeting interest, or one that was foisted upon him by his correspondents, as certain 
topics (especially mathematical ones) sometimes seem to be. Observation and 
experimentation continue throughout his lifetime and after Mersenne dies in 1648, 
Descartes laments the loss of his friend and equally the loss of his connection to the 
scientific community and experimental/observational reports.43 Even after Descartes’ 
death an interest in his experimentalism in his correspondence was quickly recognized 
and was given great attention starting from Claude Clerselier’s earliest edition of 
Descartes’ letters, even among the Académie des Sciences.44 While not in the least 
confined to his correspondence, the sheer bulk of discussion contained there should 
raise interest in the role of experimentation in Descartes’ published works and how he 
might have seen it fitting within his method. It is my contention that following 
Descartes’ own interest in experiment and observation through the Discourse and 
Essays will help sharpen the interpretive lens and clarify the lacuna presented by the 
methodological problem. Indeed, I believe that given the seeming importance of 
experimentation and observation in Descartes’ actual practice, it is relatively shocking 
that it has been so broadly ignored in discussions of his method. 
Not only is Descartes occupied with acquiring and creating experimental and 
observational reports, he is also involved in theorizing over methodological concerns of 
such reports with regard to theory and he is aware of other work done along these lines. 
                                                   
43 See Descartes to Carcavi, 11 June 1649 (AT, V: 365). 
44 For example, in the Procès-verbaux from 7 March 1691, an experiment is repeated 
where a lead ball, resting on a pillow, is hit with a hammer. Descartes had claimed that 
the ball would flatten, although the Académie’s results were just the opposite. 
18 
 
At one point, Mersenne writes to Descartes to ask if he has any advice to performing 
successful and useful experiments, to which Descartes replies,  
To this, I have nothing more to say than what Verulam45 had written about it 
except that without being too curious and researching all the little particularities 
regarding a matter, it is necessary to first make general reports of all the most 
common things that are quite certain and can be known without expense.46 
Delving into the Essays, we find that Meteors, like the Dioptrics, is a veritable treasure 
trove of experimental and observational reports ranging from the mundane common 
things just mentioned, to the elaborate. The diversity is staggering as the reports range 
from explaining the various differences in sensation produced by breathing on one’s 
hand in different ways, to a recipe for creating ice during summertime.47 But these are 
not just an uncoordinated mass of experiments; instead, they are put in a specific order, 
and generally move toward successively more detailed experiments and a set goal. So, if 
Descartes’ method is demonstrably experimental in practice and he seems to be active in 
the discussion of methodological concerns regarding the incorporation of experiment 
and observation, how can it be that his methodological work failed to represent this 
dominant element of his actual research?  
V. A Possible Solution 
 My answer to this question is relatively straightforward: instead of finding one 
unified method in the Discourse, I find two.48 When we return to the Discourse, keeping 
                                                   
45 Francis Bacon. 
46 Letter to Mersenne, January 1630 (AT, I: 109). 
47 See (AT, VI: 235) and (AT, VI: 253) respectively, for these particular examples, 
although you can turn to almost any page of Meteors and find similar cases. 
48 There has been some considerable forward movement toward breaking down the 
picture of Descartes’ method as a monolithic, for example, in Dika (2015). 
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Descartes’ experimentalism and abundance of examples in both Dioptrics and Meteors 
in mind, we find first that it is robustly colored in part VI. Not only are there explicit 
calls for more experiments, but we can also find a little discussed general plan, 
describing how to perform valuable experiments and observations. While directly 
indicating the need for more experimentation to be completed, Descartes insists that 
sending him experimental and observational reports will not be sufficient, due to a 
potential lack of rigor from the volunteer. He also points out the possibility of 
misrepresentation of facts and data stemming from the influence of false theory on one’s 
observations. To circumvent these issues, we are told that it would be better to pay 
artisans to perform the desired tasks to avoid the risk of wrong theory being infused into 
the report. Descartes, rather bluntly, ponders, 
If there were someone in this world that one could be assured to be able to find 
the most important things, and the most useful for the public that could be, and 
for this cause other men engage themselves fully, in every way, to help him bring 
his ends to fruition, I cannot see how they could contribute anything to him, if 
not by providing for the cost of the experiments [expériences] he is in need of.49  
It is not hard to imagine whom Descartes has in mind as this “someone.”50 While it is 
easy to view part VI of the Discourse as a piece of shameless self-promotion and request 
for patronage, it is important to note that directly before this apparent plea for funds, 
Descartes established an order of investigation and notes the importance of experiments 
                                                   
49 AT, VI:73. 
50 Although, if Descartes’ original plan were to publish the Discourse anonymously, it 
would be an interesting question to ask how he intended this part of the Discourse to 
bear any fruits.  
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for advanced knowledge.51 First, we are told that we must find the principles or first 
causes of everything in general. Then, now having principles to serve as a guide,52 we 
turn to the most common effects of these causes. From these common effects Descartes 
says, “I found the heavens, stars, an Earth, and more, on the earth, water, air, fire, 
minerals, and several other things.”53 Finally, when Descartes wanted to “descend to 
those more particular [truths]” he found the need to resort to several more specific 
experiments [plusieurs expériences particulieres].54 What we see here then is a 
methodological break between general truths and particular truths. 
 Even at this early stage, Descartes recognizes that some knowledge is entirely 
outside the scope of reason alone. When discussing how he is able to determine between 
competing explanations based on this principles Descartes notes the following: 
 I know no other means than by seeking additional experiments [expériences] that 
are such that their results are not the same if it is one of the ways for explaining 
it, if it is the other.55 
This method of experimentation guided by principles simply cannot be found in the four 
rules presented in part II. My claim then is that the four rules, given their vagueness and 
lack of reference to anything empirical, in their most charitable reading, might only be 
considered as a method for discovering the general rules or laws of nature—those very 
subjects that are in opposition to empirical data, as we will see in chapter II. If this is 
correct, we can explain why we do not see the application of the four rules in the Essays; 
                                                   
51 “I also noticed, regarding experiments [expériences], that they are that much more 
necessary the further one advances in knowledge” (AT, VI: 63; CSM I, 143).  
52 For this Descartes claims he considers God alone. (AT, VI: 64 CSM I, 143). 
53 AT, VI:64; CSM I, 144. 
54 AT, VI:64; CSM I, 144. 
55 In other words, when Descartes’ principles underdetermine an effect, we must search 
for a “crucial experiment” (AT, VI: 65). 
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namely, because the Essays deal almost exclusively with particular truths and are, 
therefore, outside the scope of the four rules of part II. This is most readily apparent 
when we consider that Descartes claimed to not give his principles in the Discourse, 
which in turn gives us reason to predict and absence of the four rules being employed. 
However, when we come to particular truths, which Descartes claims he will dedicate 
the rest of his life to discovering and that are the primary focus of the Meteors and 
Dioptrics, the method is experimental and observational, thus he defers to the brief 
discussion of order of enquiry presented in part VI of the Discourse.56 But if I am right, 
and we have more method claims than just part II would suggest, it still remains to 
explain exactly what Descartes believes he has left out of his method; for it would be 
wrong, as noted above, to impose more method on the Discourse than Descartes himself 
believes to be contained in it. 
 So then, what are the methodological details absent from Descartes’ Discourse? 
The answer, again, is relatively straightforward. First, Descartes does not give us his 
principles, even though he tells us, albeit in a very general form, how to arrive at them. 
This method is still sufficiently vague to allow Descartes to rest assured his principles 
will stay hidden.57 But even if we were given Descartes’ principles, these two methods 
seem hardly sufficient to generate any new knowledge on their own. What is also 
missing is how we are to connect the purely theoretical method and the 
experimental/practical method—in other words, how to connect general truths and 
particular truths. Without these principles to guide research, and without explicitly 
explaining how these principles are to do so in practice, Descartes can be justified in 
                                                   
56 AT, VI: 78. 
57 Descartes is quite explicit about his desire to keep his principles secret. See (AT, VI: 
71) for one such example. 
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claiming that a major element of his method is left out. When we return to the essays 
with this second method in mind, it is striking to see how often it is employed, and part 
of the discordance between the Discourse and its essays is removed, as we can see the 
essays as an exercise in this second method without reference to the first more general 
method. 
 It should be noted that the separation between these two methods is not 
complete. It might, in the end, be helpful to view them as part of a singular, more 
general method, but there are several problems to this type of reading when restricting 
ourselves to the presentation of the Discourse. First, as noted above, Descartes’ never 
gives us any clear way of connecting these two seemingly disparate methods. So, to 
contend that they are both part of an overarching method, we would need to do a 
significant amount of filling in the gaps. Second, even if we claim that they are both part 
of one method, this does not help our interpretive task. The most universal truths will 
still require stopping after the rules presented in part II, as continuing on to 
experimentation would result in a category mistake. Particular truths, on the other 
hand, require going further, and perhaps skipping the first set of rules, jumping to those 
rules that guide experimentation instead. In both of these cases, the method deals with 
two classes of truths in two entirely different manners, which justifies looking at both of 
these different aspects of the proposed method on their own. 
 When we return to the example of the rainbow, the exemplar of Descartes’ 
method, we can see a very clean application of the method of part VI. First, Descartes 
lists his general principles, which are noted as suppositions in the first discourse of the 
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Meteors.58 Then, when Descartes decides to discuss the particular phenomenon of a 
rainbow, he then considers “the most common effects of these causes,” namely, that 
rainbows only happen when there is water vapor present. Next, Descartes advances to 
more particular experiments, using flask filled with water to recreate rainbow-like 
effects. Then he continues to even more particular experiments involving more complex 
apparatus and specific manipulation of prisms and light. This manner of investigating 
nature is repeated time and time again in the Meteors, following the general pattern of 
setting out one’s basic principles, observing the most general naturally occurring 
phenomena, and then moving to particular experiments to help clarify the situation.  
 There is, however, a glaring hole in my interpretation of the Discourse, namely 
the Geometry. To be sure, the Geometry is decidedly not an exercise in any form of 
methodology based on experiment. Indeed, Leon Brunschvicg has even claimed that the 
Geometry is exactly what part II of the Discourse is intended to summarize,59 which is a 
theory also endorsed by Gilbert Gadoffre.60 This thesis, however, is at odds with the 
chronology of the composition of the Discourse and Essays. Remember, that Descartes 
had begun the preface (later becoming the Discourse) before he had even decided to 
include the Geometry in the work, and he had not finished the Geometry before the 
Discourse was completed.61 As further evidence, the 1644 Latin edition of the Discourse, 
did not include the Geometry at all. It would seem very strange indeed if Descartes were 
to allow the Discourse to be published without the Geometry if it were supposed to be 
                                                   
58 AT, VI: 233-235. 
59 Brunschvicg (1912).  
60 Gadoffre (1987). 
61 The role of mathematics has been grossly exaggerated in Descartes’ thought. See 
Ariew. (2014, p. 187-190), (2016), as well as Recker (1993), for an excellent defense of 
the limited role mathematics plays in Descartes’ philosophy. Cf. Koyré (1968, p. 2-13, 
1978, p. 3), and Maull (1978). 
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the primary example of the method in action. Lastly, given Descartes reluctance to 
pursue mathematics after the Geometry and having not including anything like it in any 
of his following works, it seems to me too much of a stretch to hold the Geometry up as 
Descartes’ ideal representation of his method. 
 My point here has not been to show that the Discourse and its Essays are four 
completely coherent and unified documents. Given the chronology of their composition, 
I feel it should come as no surprise that they are a bit disjointed and do not clearly 
exemplify a unified method. However, when we take into account Descartes’ repeated 
claims of presenting examples of his method, highlighting specific cases, and of giving a 
gloss of the method in the Discourse, we can show that part VI has a fairly tight 
connection with first two Essays. While this leaves out the Geometry, if we assume that 
Descartes is giving two methods, oriented toward their own object of knowledge, we 
might be able to hold, along with Gadoffre and Brunschvicg, that part II might be best 
associated with the Geometry, and still have some explanatory tools for his litany of 
methodological claims. 
VI. Conclusion 
 If all this is correct, it is difficult to see why we would be looking for only one 
method in the Discourse in the first place. Given Descartes’ practice, which we know 
through his correspondence, the traditional emphasis on part II of the Discourse as the 
solitary method simply presents too much of a discord and generates an insoluble 
methodological problem. When we take part VI of the Discourse as playing a more 
substantive role, the methodological problem mostly disappears, as there is a clear 
connection through the prescribed experimental and observational method. A further 
question might arise given my interpretation as to why this matters at all, given that we 
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should accept that the method, regardless of how many there are, is surely not 
completely guiding Descartes’ projects in natural philosophy. My answer to this 
question will become clearer in the chapters that follow, but I believe that recognizing 
the rhetorical division between two distinct methods in his writing comes with three 
interconnected benefits. First, given that Descartes believes that his method extends to 
all subjects, we can begin to explain how it could have possibly been expected to cover 
topics that range from metaphysics to medicine. Second, it gives us a clear vantage point 
to analyze why Descartes subsequent works were structured as they were, as well as 
giving more freedom in interpretation of some of his lesser discussed works, as will be 
seen in chapter three. Lastly, viewing Descartes’ experientialism as overt will help us 
connect his influence more clearly to several of the earliest proponents of Cartesianism, 
as will be seen in chapter four.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
DESCARTES’ PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND EXPÉRIENCE 
I. Descartes the Rationalist 
Among secondary literature, it has become common to accept that Descartes does 
allow for some role for experiments in his system of natural philosophy—we are now at a 
point where the caricature of Descartes-the-rationalist is now simply a cliché.62 Yet 
there still does not seem to be any genuine consensus on what the role of experiments 
and observation entails. In one of the earliest pieces directly addressing the issue, 
Gaston Milhauld claims that Descartes, at times, gives the impression of being a “perfect 
experimenter,” and thus likens the role experiment plays in his philosophy to that of a 
contemporary scientist.63 While subsequent work in Descartes scholarship has cast a 
significant amount of doubt on this type of interpretation, there is still great confusion 
over how prominently to feature experimentation in interpreting the Cartesian corpus. 
Connected to this, there are further questions as to what impact Descartes’ views on 
experimentation had on the Cartesian tradition.64 Dennis Des Chene, for example, 
writes of Descartes that, “he is, malgré lui, one of the fathers of the experimental 
philosophy.”65 Why then do we still consider that Descartes stands in some sort of 
                                                   
62 Roux (2013). 
63 Milhaud (1918, p. 227). 
64 See Blake (1929a and 1929b), Schouls (1972), Gaukroger (1995), Garber (2000, essay 
5), Georgescu and Giurgeo (2012), and Bos and Verbeek (2013) as just a few of the more 
prominent examples. 
65 DesChene (1995, p. 559). 
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opposition to the experimentalist trends of his day even if we reject the rationalist 
cliché? Of course, the rationalist themes in Descartes’ works have a very long tradition of 
commentary and are not dispensed with instantly. Including experiment into an 
interpretation is no easy task and has sometimes been referred to as an obstacle in 
understanding Descartes’ method in scientific enquiry.66 Yet, while not an obstacle in 
the sense of something to be avoided, the empirical in general does provided a 
significant tension between various elements of Descartes’ philosophy of science. 
Indeed, much of the insight we can gain regarding Descartes’ use of experimentation, 
observation, and the like, in developing his natural philosophy comes from his private 
correspondence with his peers, which creates two problems. First, we do not see the 
same level of attention to transmitting observational and experimental data in some of 
his major works. Second, while we can find a wide variety of references to observation, 
experience, and experiment, these comments can at times seem scattered or even 
contradictory. We can, for example, find references to experiment and observations that 
are glowingly receptive; yet, in other places, see signs of disdain for empirical evidence 
in relation to scientific theory.  
Adding to the general problem of tracing the concept through Descartes’ work, 
there are linguistic problems as well. The French word most often used in his 
correspondence, ‘expérience’, can be translated as ‘experience’, ‘observation’, or 
‘experiment’ depending on the context. In many places, exactly how to translate the 
                                                   
66 See, for example, Koyré (1968, p. 18). Gaukroger (1995, p. 157) tracks this rationalist 
reading back to the late 19th century, and notes, importantly, that this was certainly not 
the interpretation of Descartes’ contemporaries–especially not of Newton.  
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term is simply left underdetermined by the text.67 My general strategy will be to treat the 
term on a case by case basis, but still focus on how any empirical data can fit into his 
sophisticated system of natural philosophy, placing special emphasis on cases that are 
definitively referring to experimentation.  
This chapter will aim to answer several questions surrounding the role of 
experiment, experience, and observation in Cartesian natural philosophy. First, I will 
address how metaphysics informs observation; ultimately concluding that metaphysics 
was viewed by Descartes as the interpretive lens necessary to view any empirical data. 
Second, I will look at the apparent tensions in Descartes’ frequent dismissal of genuine 
empirical data as well as his acceptance of faulty reports—highlighting that the 
generality of the Cartesian system makes it impossible to assign any consistency to 
Descartes’ approach. This will in turn raise objections to relying too heavily on conflict 
between Descartes’ principles and observation data when interpreting the role of 
experience. Lastly, I will address whether or not experiment can serve as a verification 
tool or as a means of discover. While it is commonly held that experience can only play a 
role of discovery, I will show that discovery and verification, in the Cartesian system, are 
interwoven concepts. 
 Before we begin a positive project establishing the role of experience in Descartes’ 
philosophy of science, it will be worthwhile to briefly examine Descartes’ rationalist 
caricature, as it was not formed without some evidence. To understand how the 
caricature of Descartes rose to prominence, we must do two things very carefully: first, 
abstract Descartes from his connections to intellectual circles and context he was 
                                                   
67 See Clark (1976, p. 152) and (1989, p. 19-24) for a detailed explanation of the many 
translations of ‘expérience’ in Descartes. 
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surrounded by, and second, focus on only select published works and a carefully 
selected batch of letters. If we focus, for example, on the Meditations, it is fairly easy to 
paint a vibrant picture of Descartes comfortably absorbed in his armchair. As is well-
known, in the Meditations, Descartes is forced by a sort of hyperbolic doubt to turn 
away from sense experience, thus directing his attention inward and first examining 
himself, along with his own ideas in order to re-establish a firm foundation for the rest 
of his philosophy to be built upon. From this inward approach Descartes finds that he is 
a thinking being, his own existence cannot be doubted, the soul is immortal, and that 
God exists—all this from without ever needing to leave one’s stove-heated room! 
 Apart from the rationalist image that emerges through a superficial gloss of the 
Meditations and a general overemphasis of his metaphysics and epistemology, there are 
also substantial bits of Descartes’ correspondence depicting a philosopher removed from 
the empirical world. In a letter to Mersenne, dated 18 December 1629, for example, 
when speaking of the effect of air resistance, Descartes announces his lack of concern for 
experimental data. 
As for the magnitude, I ignore it. And even if he can make a thousand 
experiments to find it more accurately, I do not have to take the trouble to do 
them myself, if they cannot be explained by reason.68 
Much later, in February of 1639, Descartes echoes this sentiment to Mersenne, this time 
discussing empirical measurements on the angle of refraction. 
 Mr. Petit and his arguments are laughable, and it seems to me, we no longer have 
any reason to listen to him when he promises to refute my refractions through 
                                                   
68 AT I, 100. 
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experiments—as if he could show, with a poorly made square, that the three 
angles of a triangle do not equal two right angles.69  
Given these fairly damning passages, one can begin to understand the temptation to 
label Descartes the arch-rationalist. However, there is clearly a flood of evidence that he 
was much more systematically engaged with the world of observation and experiment 
than the above two quotations suggest. 
II. Descartes’ Experience with Expérience 
 We have some evidene of Descartes’ interest in observations developing at a 
relatively early stage through his encounter of Issac Beeckman.70 Descartes met 
Beeckman in 1618, and the exact scope of his influence on Descartes is still debated. 
After a fairly ugly falling out with Beeckman, Descartes himself vehemently denied any 
influence,71 but most scholars would agree that this is nothing more than prideful 
hyperbole. Earlier correspondence paints a much different picture of Beeckman’s role in 
Descartes’ development. In a letter to Beeckman from 1630, Descartes admits to having 
hoped Beeckman’s observations could help him greatly.72 Additionally, some of 
Beeckman’s proposed experiments were discussed also at some length. In a letter from 
the 22nd of August 1634, Descartes attacks the crude design of one of Beeckman’s 
proposed experiments and suggests a greatly improved variation of it to settle their 
                                                   
69 AT II, 497. 
70 Although Beeckman’s own understanding of the interplay between reason and 
experience is complex and related to his conception of physico-mathematics. See Buzon 
(2013). 
71 Descartes writes a scathing rebuttal of Beeckman’s claim to have taught him anything, 
“it has been my custom to teach myself, even from ants and worms, and they will think 
that this is how I have learned anything from you” (AT I, 156). Although in an earlier 
letter, Descartes claims that Beeckman can claim all Descartes’ writings as his own (AT 
X, 163). See van Berkel (2000) for an excellent account of Beeckman’s potential 
influence and a detailed analysis of their falling out. 
72 AT I, 156. 
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debate on the speed of light. In this experiment, Beeckman, believing that the speed of 
light is finite, proposed a simple experimental set up to measure its speed. Descartes, on 
the other hand, believed that the speed light was infinite. Beeckman’s experiment ran as 
follows: “someone holds a torch in his hand at night and moves it; if he looks in a mirror 
a quarter mile away, he will be able to tell whether he feels the movement in his hand 
before he sees it in the mirror.”73 Descartes agrees that this type of experiment would 
settle the debate, and even goes so far as to claim a positive result for Beeckman would 
spell total demise for Descartes’ philosophy, but he goes on to propose a significantly 
improved version of the experiment. Descartes’ experiment, which he claims already has 
been observed and confirmed, involves observing the location of the sun during a lunar 
eclipse. If Beeckman were correct regarding the speed of light, which he supposes to be 
slow enough to notice within a half mile of travel, we should observe the sun to be in a 
different position than it actually is, due to the requisite time for light to pass from the 
earth, reflect off the moon, and return to the earth to be seen.74 Descartes then cites 
numerous astronomers who have confirmed that the sun is not seen at the position 
Beeckman’s theory would imply, and consequently the foolishness of Beeckman’s 
position is sufficiently demonstrated. 
Yet another instance of Descartes’ early interest in experimentation and 
observation comes in the Rules. While incomplete and never published in Descartes’ 
lifetime, we can still find interesting claims regarding the nature of experience 
beginning to emerge: 
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But take someone who thinks that nothing in the magnet can be known which 
does not consist of certain self-evident, simple natures: he is in no doubt about 
how he should proceed. First he carefully gathers together all the available 
observations concerning the stone in question; then he tries to deduce from this 
what sort of mixture of simple natures is necessary for producing all the effects 
which the magnet is found to have. Once he has discovered this mixture, he is in a 
position to make the bold claim that he has grasped the true nature of the 
magnet…75 
This already is quite close to an experimental procedure to discover exactly how a 
magnet works. Further, in this passage we can also note that Descartes supposes the role 
of observation to come only after he has concluded that the subject in question cannot 
be resolved through reason alone. Establishing a distinction between truths that can be 
known through reason and those that must be discovered with the aid of experience is a 
distinction, I will contend, that is upheld throughout Descartes’ career. 
III. Reason vs. Expérience 
 Even once we make the easy transition to viewing Descartes as intensely 
interested in observation and experimentation, conclusively pinning down the role they 
play in his philosophy has yet more difficulties to overcome. At times he seems to have a 
significant degree of skepticism regarding their importance and use in natural 
philosophy.76 However, the majority of cases of overt skepticism applied to observation 
and experimentation is not necessarily evidence in favor of a purely rationalist method 
                                                   
75 CSM, 50;AT X, 427. 
76 This fact has already been highlighted in the passages taken from the two letters to 
Mersenne cited above. 
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tout court.77 Instead, we should see them more generally directed against poorly 
understood or executed observations and experiments; although what Descartes 
considered to be poorly understood or executed observations will require some 
discussion later on. 
 We can find instances of Descartes speaking out specifically against poorly 
understood experience as early as the Rules: 
We must observe that while our inferences from experience are frequently 
fallacious,… none of the mistakes which men can make are due to faulty 
inference; they are caused merely by the fact that we found upon a basis of poorly 
comprehended experience.78  
We can find an even stronger example of the same claim in Descartes’ Meteors. While 
speaking of a disagreement between the measurements taken by Francesco Maurolico 
regarding the rainbow and his own, Descartes claims this disparity “indicates the little 
trust one should place in observations which are not accompanied by the correct 
explanation.”79 Later in a letter to Huygens from 1643, Descartes is incredibly explicit of 
his lack of faith in the work of others when he claims quite bluntly, “I have little trust in 
experiments I have not performed myself.”80 The contrast Descartes makes between 
poorly done experiments and experiments performed properly by himself is apparent, 
and so we can acknowledge that his rejection of empirical data is far from wholesale, 
even though what counts as a properly performed experiment is never truly defined. 
                                                   
77 Although it would be fair to say that he does have a general preference for the a priori 
as knowledge from reason alone holds the highest degree of certainty. 
78 AT X, 368. 
79 AT VI, 340. 
80 AT III, 617. Descartes goes on, in this passage, to also cite the poor skill of artisans 
making the instruments necessary for the experiment, thus undermining even an 
experiment he was trying to recreate for himself. 
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However, we can see a broad outline emerging for his own requirements for 
observational data in his earlier comment to Huygens,and in the Discourse, where 
observation must always be “accompanied by the correct explanation.” But to 
understand this point clearly, and exactly what Descartes is pushing against, we must 
look slightly backwards to one of his early influences, Francis Bacon’s.  
IV. Order and Method in Expérience 
 There is no doubt that Descartes read at least some of Bacon’s works, as he is 
mentioned by name in correspondence. The experimental method was rapidly becoming 
the vogue during Descartes’ time and the subject of scholarly debate. When asked by 
Mersenne how one should conduct successful experiments, Descartes is fairly quick to 
defer to Bacon—albeit with a slight criticism of his exact method. 
To this, I have nothing more to say than what Verulam had written about it 
except that without being too curious and researching all the little particularities 
regarding a matter, it is necessary to first make general reports of all the most 
common things that are quite certain and can be known without expense.81 
Seven years later, this criticism is echoed again in the Discourse on Method. Here, as 
noted in Chapter I, Descartes not only claims that we must start with general 
observations before moving to particulars, but before any observation we must first have 
already found some basic principles to guide us. If we take Bacon as propounding a 
method that starts from sensory experience and moves from this mass of information 
                                                   
81 Letter to Mersenne, January 1630 (AT I, 109). Other references to Bacon can be found 
in AT I, 195-196, and 251. This seems to be directly contrary to what is written in the 
Rules: “Before tackling any specific problems we ought first to make a random selection 
of truths which happen to be at hand, and ought then to see whether we can deduce 
some other truths from them step by step, and from these still others, and so on in a 
logical sequence” (AT X, 384 ;CSM I, 23).  
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toward axioms/principles, we can take Descartes as rebutting this and moving in just 
the opposite direction.82 Descartes’ worry in this matter seems to be that even if we 
collect a mass of information, we will still need to devise a consistent method for 
interpreting and extracting information from it. Basic sense perception can lead us to 
ungrounded conclusions, such as the taste of food being located within the food and not 
the perceiver, dreams being perceived as reality, or white things perceived as yellow 
when sick with jaundice. In these cases, his insistence on theory before perception 
seems well-placed. Principles, discovered through reason alone, are supposed to serve to 
weed out faulty observations from true ones, and equally help pin down the content of 
such observations to ensure that our scientific pursuits are well-founded. In other 
words, if observation and experimentation are used to “interrogate” nature, Descartes’ 
principles are to serve to regulate what can be asked and what would count as an 
acceptable answer; without these guidelines any interrogation would be rather pointless. 
 We can now start to piece together some of outlines of the role of observation and 
experience. First, the role of theory, (i.e., the development of basic principles through 
reason alone) is in some sense prior to observation and experimentation. We can further 
infer that this is a one-sided relationship, insofar as the basic principles inform 
observation but observation does not inform the basic principles. Thus, in a limited 
sense, observation plays a secondary role in Descartes’ philosophy. I say “limited sense” 
because what we have discussed up to this point has not ruled out observational data as 
a possible source of scientific knowledge; such data simply must be supplemented 
before it can be accepted. Indeed, as we saw in chapter I, observational and 
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experimental data for Descartes will have what could be considered as a primary role in 
certain areas of scientific enquiry.  
 At this point it might be helpful to return to the first two anti-experimental 
quotations above, where Descartes rejects an experimental data in refuting his own 
position on refraction and air resistance. In both cases there is no complete rejection of 
experimentation’s relevance to physics, but instead what seems to be an accusation of a 
simple category mistake—and therefore misunderstood expérience. In the same way 
that no one would accept a refutation of arithmetic through observation or experiment, 
Descartes refuses to accept such a refutation for several laws of physics and some basic 
metaphysical principles—in this case for refraction and the relationship of sound to 
vibration.  
Despite the priority of reason, the need for accepting empirical data is never 
denied, because the basic laws and principles are insufficient to explain all observable 
phenomena. The simplicity of Descartes’ laws of nature and principles of natural 
philosophy underdetermine their effects due to the extreme simplicity required to be 
included as laws or principles. Descartes acknowledges a great many facts, such as the 
interval of the tides, the temperature that water freezes at, the composition of seawater, 
and many others that will be left unexplained if he were to attempt explanations based 
only on principles derived through purely a priori means. We have then a kind of two-
tiered system, consistent with the two methods outlined in the previous chapter. For 
those things to which we can apply reason alone, clear and distinct perceptions, we have 
no need to look at the actual world; for everything else, we will need careful observation 
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and experiments, which must align with the basic precepts of reason.83 This two-tiered 
system is a natural consequence of Descartes’ belief that the undergirding structure of 
the world, which lies beyond the capability of our five senses, could have been organized 
in a radically different manner than the way we actually find it.84 This thought is most 
clearly expressed in Descartes’ often-quoted two-clock example where he draws an 
analogy between our experience of the world and that of our perception of two different 
clocks. We are told that we merely see the surface of the world, just as we only see the 
surface of the clock, and from this information alone we can begin to draw hypotheses as 
to the inner workings, which are beyond our senses. Of course, in the clock, there could 
be a number of different arrangements of cogs, springs, and wheels that would create a 
clock that keeps accurate time, and Descartes claims that the same holds of our world as 
well. Because nature is underdetermined in this way, we must resort to different 
methods to come to a full picture of the inner workings. These two types of truths, the 
empirical and the a priori, are also separated by varying degrees of certainty. The 
former group is categorized as merely morally certain, while the latter group is 
considered absolutely certain, which is to say we cannot help but assent after we have 
clearly and distinctly perceived a particular truth, and we cannot conceive of them as 
being otherwise.  
                                                   
83 See also Loeb (1990). 
84 While my Descartes point here is simply that the microscopic world might have been 
ordered differently, there is good reason to believe that this view could be taken to a 
much further extreme, given Descartes discussion of the eternal truths. While Curley 
(1984) argues against this point, both Nadler (1987) and Kaufman (2005) provide an 
excellent grounding for a more thoroughgoing interpretation of the doctrine of the 
eternal truths that entails they could have been otherwise. However, even if Descartes 
believes the eternal truths cannot change, that does not entail the outward appearances 
will remain the same.  
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 This relatively uncontroversial interpretation of Descartes’ integration of 
experiment and observation as being needed to supplement reason, yet still governed by 
it, goes a long way to explain instances of overt rejection of data. However, even 
restricting this study to the subset of Descartes’ natural philosophy that is open to the 
use of experiment and observation, we are still presented with several interpretive 
problems. First, we need to answer on what grounds he rejects experimental and 
observational reports that pass muster with regard to reason? Second, can observation 
and experimentation fill a role as a verification or discovery process at all? Lastly, and 
related to the previous question, does Descartes accept refutation of theory based on 
experiment or observation—in other words, does he accept anything like critical 
experiments? To answers these questions, we will have to get a bit more precise on the 
variety and kinds of reports Descartes had dealt with. 
V. Accepting and Rejecting: Observational Reports 
 In his renowned System of Natural Philosophy, Jacques Rohault (1618-1672), 
being the meticulous experimenter that he was, diligently reports the effect of sticking 
his finger directly in his eyeball.85 Of course, the result is visual disturbances: in this 
case, seeing double. This type of observation is often repeated and communicated 
during the early modern period. Descartes himself excitedly reported the results of a 
similar experiment where, after resting his head on his hand for some time, was able to 
see multiple coronas surrounding a candle on his boat.86 Both philosophers had quite 
different purposes in mind for this type of experiment, but both deemed even these very 
common instances important enough to be communicated; indeed, Descartes even saw 
                                                   
85 Rohault (1987 vol. I, pg. 256). 
86 Descartes to Golius (AT I, 319). A similar example is brought up in L’Homme (AT XI, 
161). An even earlier example is found in a letter to Mersenne, 18 December 1629. 
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fit to include this experiment later in his Meteores, along with a great many other simple 
experiments the reader could easily try without any elaborate apparatus.87 The veracity 
of such simple experiments are hardly questionable; the reader needs only to stick his 
own finger in his eye to replicate the results of Rohault and Descartes. Descartes clearly 
had a preference for just these types of general and readily available experiments. 
However, simple experiments and observations such as these, as important as they 
might have been for the time, were not always sufficient to explain the more complex 
phenomena. More elaborate and difficult to perform experiments, as well as rare 
observations, were necessary and frequently communicated between Descartes and his 
correspondents. Surrounding the communication of these more elaborate experiments 
or rare observations, Descartes offers a full spectrum of reactions. At times he was 
delighted to receive the data and quickly incorporated it into his own work. Quite 
understandably, in other cases he is rather skeptical of the purported results, and in yet 
other cases he is outright dismissive.  
 In a letter from April of 1634 to Mersenne, Descartes dismisses out of hand a 
series of experiments performed by Galileo relating to the motion of the earth. The 
reason for the rejection of these experiments is less than clear. Descartes himself cites 
that there may be “other reasons” that explain the result, but he remains no less 
convinced that the earth in fact moves—obviously, for different reasons.88 In a much 
later exchange with Elisabeth, Descartes is quite dubious of the benefits of a widely 
reported healing fountain.89 According to him, it simply would not be conceivable for a 
single remedy to be able to cure so many different ailments. Descartes is equally 
                                                   
87 AT VI, 351-352. 
88 AT I, 287; CSMK, 43. 
89 AT IV, 531. Elisabeth expressed her own skepticism as well. 
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judicious in deriding the purported efficacy of astrological prognostications, instead 
ascribing the effects to mere self-fulfilling prophecies, with no reference to astral 
influence at all.90 Even with his most trusted correspondent, Mersenne, Descartes is 
sometimes fairly skeptical of reported experimental results or observation. In April of 
1634, Descartes asks, through Mersenne, for anyone to recreate an experiment that he 
had recently read about. As Descartes recounts, a canon is pointed directly upward and 
fired, afterward the cannonball is reported to have never returned to earth.91 Mersenne, 
upon this request, diligently recreates the experiment, firing a large rifle directly 
upward. He reported back that the ball was never found, which confirmed the original 
report. Descartes, however, is unsatisfied with Mersenne’s results. Instead he suggests 
that the experiment be repeated with some significant adjustments. Instead of the rifle, 
he requests a larger canon be used attached to a series of weights and counterbalances 
and suspended above a large hole dug in the ground in an attempt to remove any chance 
of the ball straying from the perpendicular due to recoil movement.92 It is important to 
note that even though Descartes believed that the reported outcome of the ball not 
returning to earth aligned perfectly well with his theory, the experimental setup needed 
substantially more rigor before he could accept it at face value.93 
 All of this might strike the modern ear as being a few relatively uninteresting 
examples of good scientific method casting off the nonsensical and pseudo-scientific. 
However, as anyone who has spent some time reading Descartes can attest, he has no 
shortage of far-fetched beliefs and is not always as judicious regarding other poorly 
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93 Passages such as these do give some credence to Milhauld’s glowing approval of 
Descartes’ experimental methodology. 
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substantiated observational and experimental reports. In perhaps the most famous and 
telling example, Descartes claims in the Principles that his laws of nature, along with 
subtle matter, can explain the most “rare and marvelous effects,” such as: a dead 
person’s wound suddenly bleeding when a murderer enters the room, telepathic 
connections between friends or enemies, and premonitions.94 At this late stage in 
Descartes’ career, it seems as if he is willing to accept the most far-fetched reports as 
credible and worthy of inclusion into his mechanical theory of explanation. The question 
arises: is there any consistency in Descartes’ reasoning for rejecting so many 
experimental and observational reports and accepting a wide variety of others? 
 There are a number of possible interpretations to give here. First, at the most 
superficial level, we should account for Descartes’ own explicit standards for accepting 
reports. As we saw earlier, Descartes prefers experiments he is able to perform himself 
and believes that others are simply too prone to skewing their results to fit a particular 
theory. Thus, in the Discourse, he claims that it will be necessary to either perform each 
experiment or observation himself or pay a skilled artisan to perform it for him.95 Of 
course, Descartes does not adhere to his self-prescribed rules. The vast majority of 
reports that Descartes received were not from anyone who subscribed whole-heartedly 
to the Cartesian system. Given that most of the reports he receives are unsolicited, this 
might easily be forgiven. However, even when Descartes asks for some specific 
experiment or observation to be made, he almost never offers compensation per his 
requirement. Perhaps, given the Discourse’s incredibly blunt request for patronage and 
the lack of subsequent funds pouring in, it is not terribly surprising to see such a 
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demand for costly rigor fall by the wayside. It is, after all, more than clear in his 
correspondence that he is not letting any observations or experiments go simply for not 
conforming to the rigorous standards laid out in the Discourse.  
There are other options beyond Descartes’ own standards for making sense of 
when he accepts and rejects observational reports from his correspondents. The 
received view is that Descartes simply rejects anything that does not correspond with his 
system and actively adopts or attempts to explain anything that might cleanly fit within 
it.96 This view is quiet attractive, as it offers a clean explanation and fits nicely with the 
image of Descartes qua methodologist. There is good textual evidence supporting such a 
reading. For example, we can look toward Descartes’ well-documented insistence on 
rejecting the possibility of a void.97 Here, it is important to note that Descartes rejects 
even the possibility of accepting any experimental evidence for the existence of a void. 
This sentiment is most clearly expressed in a letter to Mersenne from the 31st of January 
1648. 
I do not know, given that your researchers of the void want to do their 
experiment in a chamber where it is so well sealed that the outside air would have 
no contact there. This is what they will not easily accomplish. But, if they do 
accomplish it, I assure you that the mercury will not in any way fall from the 
hose; not because it is lighter, nor that the column of air resists it more, but 
because there is no place in the chamber where it can move to, because it will be 
totally full of air.98 
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97 See Chapter V for more detail on this subject. 
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We can see Descartes’ fears of theory-ladenness, first expressed in the Discourse, 
strongly reiterated. Any report of a void will necessarily be unacceptably infused with 
false theory, directly contradicting one of Descartes’ most basic principles; thus the 
observation must be reinterpreted at best, or completely rejected at worst. The principle 
here “that nothing can have no property” is prior to any and all experience. 
 There are, of course, several other examples in a similar vein where Descartes 
openly rejects observational reports due to their disagreement with his own philosophy. 
All this again strongly reinforces the view that he is only willing to accept something if it 
is already in agreement with his own expectations and theoretical commitments. This 
reading has the further implication that any empirical evidence cannot be used to either 
verify or falsify his core commitments. In other words, many of the results of 
experimentation are already predetermined by Descartes’ physics—unexpected results 
force radical reinterpretation to fit. However, while this reading can account for some 
cases (such as experiments on the void above), it fails to adequately address a great 
many other cases where the conflict of observation and principles is less than clear. 
Indeed, I believe that cases like the void where there is clear conflict between 
experimental results and core theory are incredibly rare. To highlight that Descartes’ 
rejection and acceptance of various observational and experimental reports is more 
complicated than initially thought, I would like to focus on three features of Descartes’ 
system: namely, his belief that his own basic principles underdetermine effects, that a 
system must be judged by its explanatory power, and his apparent endorsement of 
crucial experiments. 
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VI. Problems of Interpretation 
 By the end of the 17th century a persistent objection against Cartesianism had 
solidified; namely, that even though Descartes and his followers positioned themselves 
as against occult explanations and empty theory, they had fallen into just that. The basic 
objection, repeated most vocally by Huet, is that the Cartesian system can, in fact, 
explain anything it likes by a means of unspecified shapes, motions, and bits of matter. 
This objection becomes even more salient given the history of Cartesianism, as we can 
find concrete examples of early Cartesians attempting to explain a variety of subjects 
that most likely would have shocked Descartes—such as the biblical description of 
creation or astrology, among other topics. 
 Descartes himself expressed his concern for the extreme generality of his 
principles and their potential explanatory overreach rather early in the Discourse. 
 I venture to say that I have never noticed anything…which I could not explain 
quite easily by the principles I had discovered. But I must also admit that the 
power of nature is so ample and so vast, and these principles so simple and so 
general, that I notice hardly any particular effect of which I do not know at once 
that it can be deduced from the principles in many different ways.99 
Here we can notice not only that all phenomena can be deduced from his principles, but 
that the very deduction that explains the phenomena could be performed in many 
different ways, thus doubling the generality problem. In the Discourse, the solution to 
both layers of this problem is found through continued observation and 
experimentation, which ignores more sophisticated problems of interpretation.100 
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However, shortly after the Discourse, a more refined solution to the problem of over 
generality beings to emerge. In a letter to Morin dated 13 July 1638, Descartes claims 
that it is a cause’s ability to fit too many different effects that helps us to solidify its 
status as the true cause and explanation of those effects. This type of solution is echoed 
several times in the correspondence and then again in part IV of the Principles.101 Thus, 
if a set of principles can explain more phenomena, it is a sign of a good starting point for 
Descartes. If this is indeed Descartes position, it becomes difficult to believe that he 
would have found Huet’s objection troublesome at all—it’s not a bug, it’s a feature. 
Descartes’ position also makes it difficult to hold that he only accepts observational 
reports if they accord well with his principles, as he himself believes that his principles 
can explain any observed phenomena, and further that the role of such phenomena is to 
be used to help determine, in some way, the correct explanation.  
 There is another passage in the Discourse that sheds more light onto exactly what 
role observational reports are supposed to serve in Descartes’ philosophy where he 
proposes an important role for something akin to crucial experiments. Speaking again 
on how to determine which explanatory application of his principles is the correct one, 
Descartes states in part VI of the Discourse, “I know of no other means to discover this 
than seeking other observations whose outcomes vary according to which of these ways 
provides the correct explanation.”102 There are two things to note regarding this passage. 
First, there is at least an apparent willingness for his principles to be challenged, or at a 
minimum, for a definitive empirical basis to be established, allowing his system to be 
confirmed or to challenge other theories. At surface level at least, we do not see the 
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dogmatic refusal of all observations that do not agree with his theory. Second, this kind 
of call to put rival theories to the test is a bit of a singularity in Descartes’ published 
works, occurring only in part VI of the Discourse. In his correspondence, while I have 
not been able to find any explicit acceptancy of crucial experiment, we can see these 
types of crucial experiments employed in practice. 
VII. Crucial Experiments and Verification 
 As discussed in more detail in chapter I, we saw in an early exchange with 
Beeckman that Descartes was keen to quickly disprove Beeckman’s view that the speed 
of light is finite. There, the most efficient method to refute Beeckamn was to propose an 
experiment that would neatly decide between the two hypotheses.103 This appeal to a 
crucial experiment-like scenario is equally well demonstrated in a later exchange with 
Plempius in 1638. Among the wide range of objections that Plempius and Fromundus 
bring up is a central criticism of Descartes’ theory of the heart’s function. In short, 
Plempius objects that heat cannot possibly be the explanation for the circulation of 
blood as even cold blooded animals’ blood circulates. In response, Descartes cites a 
rather dubious experiment reportedly performed recently by himself. 
 But if you were with me now, you would have to admit that even in the coldest 
animals this movement proceeds from heat. For you would see, in fact, the tiny 
heart of an eel I took out this morning, seven or eight hours ago, giving no signs 
of life and already dry on the surface, reviving and beginning to beat rather 
rapidly when a little heat is applied to it.104 
                                                   
103 Although, of course, Descartes failed to consider the third option that light moved 
many times faster than Beeckman had believed. 
104 AT II, 66. 
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These examples, among a great many others contained in the Plempius/Descartes 
correspondence, show Descartes’ interest in using observational and experimental 
reports as tools to rule out competing explanation. In cases where he engages in 
disproving others, Descartes is all too happy to suggest crucial experiments, but there is 
not much evidence to show that he ever endorsed a similar method regarding his own 
many possible application of principles to a given phenomena. I have been able to find 
only one instance where Descartes turns the crucial experiment inwards. In a letter to 
Ciermans, he claims that an experiment could cause him to change his explanation of 
the color red.105   
At this point, I should reiterate that even though there are several clear examples 
of the use of crucial-experiment-like scenarios in his correspondence, the only explicit 
acceptance of crucial experiments as a means for determining between competing 
theories occurs in the Discourse. It is glaringly absent in the Principles, and equally 
ignored throughout the correspondence.  The endorsement of crucial experiments is at 
best an abnormality. Descartes’ acceptance of crucial experiments becomes equally 
more problematic when we consider whether experimentation can be used as a means of 
discovery or verification. If we consider again Descartes’ belief that any phenomena 
could be explained by his principles in more than one way, it is difficult to see how any 
experiment could serve as a verification tool.106 Indeed, any one experiment would 
appear to verify any number hypotheses that employ various applications of Descartes’ 
principles. Commentators tend to agree, however, that experiment serves as a means of 
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106 Schouls (1972) argues that experiment could not serve to verify a hypothesis as any 
disagreement would constitute a break from method and, therefore, a break from 
reason. I believe that since so much of Descartes’ science is not based on reason alone, 
nor does it require absolute certainty, Schoul’s argument falls apart. 
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discovery, while verification runs counter to Descartes’ refusal to accept experimental 
evidence against his principles, as well as the underdetermination problem. The most 
prominent examples of Descartes systematically using experiments often show him 
engaged in asking a simple question and designing an experiment to solve it. For 
example, when Descartes goes about discovering how light can form a rainbow, he sets 
up a simple experiment to determine at what angles in relation to the observer a flask 
full of water will produce the color red when held to a light source.107 There are 
abundant examples where experiments are used to generate unexpected effects, identify 
necessary conditions for the occurrence of phenomena, extend the domain of 
investigation, and identifying a causal history.108 However, nowhere is Descartes’ use of 
experimentation designed to actively test predictions of a theory, and thus cannot serve 
as a verification tool. This account, at least in part, seems true, but it fails to sufficiently 
account for the unity of Descartes’ natural philosophy. Descartes believed that the 
strength of his system is derived from the variety of phenomena it could explain—
indeed, this is Descartes’ solution to the famed two-clock example. 
To square Descartes’ various claims of the strength of explanation, we must 
consider the strength of any given explanation in light of not any single experiment, but 
against the backdrop of a great many. This is best exemplified within the exchange 
between Descartes and Plempius. In this example, Descartes is attempting to prove his 
hypothesis that the microscopic particles that make up water are shaped like tiny eels 
and that this shape is sufficient to explain its properties. As each different observation is 
supposed to bolster the hypothesis, I include the entire rather lengthy passage.  
                                                   
107 See Buchwald (2008) for a more detailed account of the series of experiments leading 
to Descartes’ explanation of the rainbow.  
108 Georgescu and Giurgea (2012, p. 179). 
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If water is more fluid and harder to freeze than oil, this is an indication that oil is 
made of parts that easily stick with one another, like the branches of trees, while 
water is made of more slippery parts, like those with the shape of eels. But 
experience shows that water is more fluid and harder to freeze than oil. 
Therefore, etc. 
 Similarly, if cloths soaked in water dry more easily than those soaked in 
oil, that is an indication that the parts of water have the shapes of eels, for they 
easily come through the pores in the cloth, and that the parts of oil have the 
shapes of branches that become entangled in the same pores; but experience, 
etc. 
 Similarly, if water is heavier than oil, this is an indication that the parts of 
oil are like branches, and so leave many gaps around them, and that the parts of 
water are like eels, and thus are content with less space; but, etc. 
 Similarly, if water evaporates more easily or, as the chemists say, is more 
volatile than oil, this is a sign that it is composed of parts which, like eels, can 
easily be separated from one another, while the parts of oil are like branches that 
are more closely intertwined. But, etc. 
 Although each of these considered in isolation gives only some probability, 
taken together they amount to a proof.109 
In this scenario we see a number of simple experiments and observations mutually 
supporting the basic hypothesis. Each bit of empirical data serves an essential support of 
the scaffolding, yet no single piece is enough to account for the whole structure. Each 
experiment or observation here serves to discover a new property of water or oil, but no 
                                                   
109 Descartes to Plempius, 20 Dec 1637 (AT I, 476). 
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single experiment is used to actually test the hypothesis that water particles are eel-
shaped. However, when taken as a complete set of experiments, they serve precisely as a 
verification of Descartes’ hypothesis. The interlocking nature of observational reports in 
Descartes gives them the unusual character of serving both as a means of discovery and 
a verification tool at the same time. 
VIII. Conclusion  
 In this chapter I have argued that Descartes’ metaphysics guides his 
experimentation and serves as the lens through which experimental and observational 
results are interpreted. Despite the primacy of metaphysics with regard to empirical 
data, the generality of Descartes’ principles removes the possibility of this primacy being 
used to explain Descartes’ frequent acceptance/rejection of data. Instead, a better 
explanation would be that he inconsistently incorporated those reports based on a 
variety of factors that would not be useful to elaborate upon—the absence of method in 
this regard being my only point. Given the overly general nature of Descartes’ principles, 
I have shown that while he explicitly endorses crucial experiments in the Discourse, we 
only have concrete examples of him using these as a mode of attack, and almost never 
turns them inward. However, far from only using experiment and observation only as a 
weapon, we must take Descartes as holding a dual purpose for the empirical side of his 
natural philosophy. First, as is commonly accepted, experimentation was used a method 
of discovery—it pointed to unknown properties of the material world and revealed 
interesting effects that warranted explanation. Beyond this, however, the unity of 
Descartes’ system also entails that each experiment played a verification role as well. 
Each new phenomena that could be discovered through experiment and explained via 
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Descartes’ natural philosophy lent credibility to the overarching hypothesis that all of 
the natural world could be explained by size, shape, and motion. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE PHYSICS OF DESCARTES’ ETHICS 
I. Introduction 
The study of Descartes’ ethical theory produces several problems of interpretation. 
We must address, for example, the very basic problem of where to look for the core of 
his theory. Descartes left no treatise on ethics or any substantial discussion of ethics in 
his published work, which in part explains the sparse commentary on the subject and 
Descartes’ limited reputation as an ethicist. Traditionally, the primary discussion of 
Descartes’ moral thought centers on his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth and 
Queen Christina (with some input from Pierre Chanut). However, upon closer 
examination there is a great deal of ethical content elsewhere in his corpus, most 
notably in the Passions of the Soul (hereafter Passions), which is informed and partially 
derived from this correspondence.110 Yet, the Passions, far from a derivative work, adds 
considerably to the correspondence and, as I will argue, gives us a clearer vantage point 
to view the full scope of his ethical theory. Of course this is not a radical claim—
commentators have often focused their discussions on the overtly ethical language used 
in certain sections of the Passions. However, viewing the Passions under a primarily 
ethical lens is not without its own unique set of problems, which have often been 
overlooked. Perhaps the most obvious difficulty comes very early on in the Passions 
                                                   
110 There are, of course, other works where we can look. Apart from the Discourse on 
Method, which will be discussed later, Shapiro (2008) finds some very convincing traces 
in the Meditations. 
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when Descartes describes his own project: “My plan was not to explain the passions as 
an Orator, nor even as a moral philosopher, but merely as a physicist.”111 In this regard, 
it might seem a bit odd that many commentators have looked for insight into Descartes’ 
ethical theory in the Passions—exactly where he denies giving any at all. However, 
taking Descartes seriously in viewing the Passions as primarily written qua physicist 
does not necessarily exclude a robust connection with his broader ethical project. In 
fact, given Descartes’ frequent claims of general continuity throughout his philosophic 
system—morals and physics included—we might expect such a connection almost 
anywhere in his corpus. This claim is most prominently expressed in Descartes oft-cited 
tree analogy in the preface to the French edition of his Principles of Philosophy. In the 
analogy Descartes compares the roots of a tree to metaphysics, its trunk to physics, and 
the various branches to specific practical fields of science that yield “fruit.” According to 
this analogy, the most perfect morality depends on the tree as a whole, and therefore, 
requires the knowledge of all other sciences.112 This claim occurs again in a letter to 
Chanut where Descartes asserts, “truths of Physics are part of the foundation of the 
highest and most perfect morality.”113 At times, Descartes even claimed that his studies 
pertaining to physics had a direct role in advancing his moral thinking.114  
                                                   
111 “[M]on dessein n’a pas esté d’expliquer les Passion en Orateur, ny mesme en 
Philosophe moral, mais seulement en Physicien” (AT XI, 326). This passage has been 
widely debated in commentary on the passions. Translation of this passage has also 
been contested. Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch and Kenny translate “physcien” as 
natural philosopher, while Nancy Struever insists, as will be discussed later, that a better 
translation would be physician. I have chosen to translate it here simply as “physicist” to 
emphasize Descartes’ insistence on separating himself from those who came before him, 
who did write as natural philosophers and physicians. 
112 AT IXb, 14. 
113 AT V, 291; CSMK, 368. 
114 See Descartes to Elisabeth (AT IV, 291-292; CSMK, 265-266) and again to Pierre 
Chanut, May 1646 (AT IV, 441). However, one might well question Descartes’ sincerity 
54 
 
This chapter begins an analysis of Descartes as a moral thinker informed by his 
physics and explores avenues where the Passions can neatly fit within such a project. To 
start plotting out a course, I will first look at Descartes’ provisional moral code and his 
correspondence with Elisabeth and Christina—two areas traditionally seen as the 
backbone of his ethics. First, I will be highlighting areas of these exchanges that bring 
the tension in associating Cartesian physics with ethics into full relief. Second, I will try 
to isolate Descartes’ considered view in his correspondence and use this as a test case for 
any connection to his physics. Following this, I will move toward the Passions of the 
Soul by filling in surrounding context, in hopes of showing that my own interpretation 
of Descartes has some historically relevant precedence. Ultimately, in the last section of 
this chapter, I will conclude that even Descartes’ ethics is subject to a two-fold 
methodology, which includes the need for empirical testing and observation. 
II. Provisional Code—Just how Provisional? 
 To establish the core of Descartes’ ethical theory, I will begin by generally tracing 
some of the broad outlines of context surrounding Descartes moral thought 
chronologically. As is well known, Descartes was at first fairly hesitant to make his 
moral theorizing public.115 Despite this reluctance, his first major publication, the 
Discourse on Method, includes what he termed a “provisional morality.” This initial 
foray into ethical theorizing is remarkably straightforward and succinct—composed of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
here, as it may well be the case that he was simply attempting to drum up interest in his 
Principles, which he was sending to Chanut, who was clearly more interested in ethical 
matters than physics. 
115 Descartes gives various reasons for wanting to refrain from writing on morals. At one 
point he claims he fears a potentially dangerous reception, while later he claims that 
only sovereigns should trouble themselves with such a study, thus he has no obligation 
to publish anything for the common person (AT IV, 536; CSMK 299:AT V, 87; CSMK, 
326).  
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“just three or four maxims.”116 In his first rule, he submits himself to the laws and 
customs of the country he lives in, along with its religion. In the second, he decides “to 
be as firm and decisive in my actions as I could, and to follow even the most doubtful 
opinions, once I had adopted them, with no less constancy than if they had been quite 
certain.”117 For his third maxim, he takes on the stoic doctrine: “to try always to master 
myself rather than fortune, and change my desires rather than the order of the world.”118 
There is a fourth rule, which states that one should survey all the professions and choose 
the best, although the status of this rule is somewhat questionable for two reasons. First, 
as already stated, there might only be three maxims which casts doubt on the status of at 
least one of the rules.119 Second, as we will see later on, this fourth maxim disappears 
from later versions of the provisional code. 
The objectives of the provisional moral code explain why Descartes includes it, 
despite being generally reluctant to enter into moral discussion. First, and most 
superficially, Descartes’ states his goal of a provisional code. His project is a complete 
overhaul of philosophy. But given Descartes understands philosophy as a field of study 
that guides life, without any immediate replacement, he would be left with no method to 
go about his day-to-day business or research. As Descartes simply puts, “before starting 
to rebuild your house,120 it is not enough to simply pull it down…you must also provide 
                                                   
116 Of course, claiming that his code is made up of “just three or four maxims” already 
adds significant ambiguity (AT IV, 22; CSM I, 122. Emphasis added). However, I will be 
focusing only on the first three, which will be repeated elsewhere in Descartes’ corpus, 
while the “fourth” maxim is never brought up again. 
117 AT VI, 24; CSM I, 123. 
118 AT VI, 25; CSM I, 123. 
119 AT VI, 22; CSM I, 122 (emphasis added). 
120 The metaphor of a house seems to be fairly important for Descartes and he returns to 
it later in his Meditations. See Flage and Bonnen (1999, p. 6-9) for a more detailed 
discussion of how this metaphor is filled in. 
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yourself with some other place where you can live.”121 However, this moral code does 
serve a second objective; namely, to serve as a preemptive rebuttal to objections 
regarding his use of the method of doubt. Descartes announces just this intention in a 
letter to Reneri for Pollot. 
 Finally, I was forced to speak of firmness and resolution in action for the sake of 
ease of conscience and to prevent people from blaming me for saying that in 
order to avoid rashness we must once in our lifetime put aside all the opinions we 
have hitherto believed. Otherwise it seemed that people would have objected that 
such a universal doubt could give rise to great indecision and moral chaos.122  
Thus, Descartes brushes aside the basic objection to skepticism. While doubt leads to 
indecision and inaction, a simple acknowledgement of the basic demands of life will not 
permit anyone such a luxury.123 
 With the provisional moral code, we see a very simple version of Descartes’ 
means for existing without conflict. He avoids the Pyrrhonian pitfalls of inaction and 
permanent doubt, while he completes his philosophic and scientific system. Yet, there is 
notably no mention of virtue or vice, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness, or any real 
normative or objective element. The provisional code is explicitly introduced as a 
personal code, presented as a mere observation of how Descartes leads his own life. It 
becomes abundantly clear that Descartes never intended this code to be “the highest and 
                                                   
121 AT VI, 22; CSM I, 122. 
122 AT II, 35; CSMK 97. This quite emphatically argued for by Nicolas-Joseph Poisson in 
his 1670 Commentaire ou Remarque sur la method de René Descartes, where despite 
Descartes’ own claims on the matter, Poisson still feels the need to defend against 
charges paralysis brought about by skepticism (p. 98-105). 
123 Even though Descartes makes multiple attempts to preemptively defend himself 
against the charge of taking skepticism too seriously, these allegations follow him 
throughout his career. See Verbeek’s excellent book, Descartes and the Dutch, for a 
detailed account of some of these accusations in the Dutch context.  
57 
 
most perfect morality.” When speaking of the second rule of the provisional code, again 
in the letter to Reneri for Pollot, “I apply this rule mainly to actions in life which admit 
of no delay, and I use it only provisionally, intending to change my opinions as soon as I 
can find better, and to lose no opportunity of looking for them.”124 While directly 
asserting this only for the second maxim, it seems clear that the observation holds 
generally for the entire provisional moral code, given its stated purpose. Despite its 
explicit provisional status and his active enquiry to find better, Descartes’ returns to this 
moral code eight years later in a letter to Princess Elisabeth, giving it a fairly surprising 
amount of staying power. This eight year span alone seems to lend credence to some 
commentators’ belief that the provisional morality, after serving its purpose of 
sustaining Descartes during initial research, is eventually solidified into at least part of 
his definitive moral system.125 
 There are further reasons to believe that Descartes’ provisional morality does 
indeed have enough staying power to become part of his definitive morality. First, the 
purpose of the provisional morality, as Descartes claims, was to give him a means to 
conduct day-to-day life as he completes his metaphysical and physical systems. By 1644 
Descartes had published the Latin version of his most ambitious work, the Principles of 
Philosophy. The Principles, containing both a basic overview of his metaphysical 
thought along with his physics, should give us reason to believe that Descartes was 
finally in a suitable position to competently complete a moral system—or at least no 
                                                   
124 AT II, 35; CSMK 97. A similar sentiment is expressed in the preface to the French 
translation of the Principles, AT IX, 13; CSM I, 186. 
125 See Shapiro (2008), Marshall (1998), Le Doeuff (1980) as prime exemplars of this 
type of view, and to a lesser extent, Gilby (2011), who softens Le Doeuff’s thesis that 
Descartes’ claim that par provision is a legal phrase roughly equivalent to a “down 
payment.” 
58 
 
longer fear being without shelter.126 Thus, it is telling when we see Descartes return to 
the provisional moral code in a letter to Princess Elisabeth in August of 1645, well after 
the Principles is completed. It is important to note, however, that the provisional moral 
code is returned to but not repeated. In the second iteration there are some significant 
changes. Descartes’ first maxim of the provisional code in the Discourse—to follow the 
customs and laws of one’s country—is noticeably absent.127 Instead we are given a new 
first rule: “[one] should always try to employ his mind as well as he can to discover what 
he should or should not do in all circumstances of life.”128 Immediately this highlights a 
substantially different tone for Elisabeth than for the general audience of Discourse.129 
The need for practicality and immediate use, so prevalent in the Discourse, has all but 
disappeared. It’s replaced with an emphasis on discovery. At this point, we might posit 
that the difference could reflect Descartes tailoring the presentation of his ethics to 
Elisabeth, specifically keeping in mind her political standing. It would be quite strange 
to instruct a member of royalty to follow the customs of one’s land.130 While this 
interpretation might hold for the first maxim, changes to the following rules are 
inconsistent with such a simple reading. 
                                                   
126 However, Descartes does admit that his physics is not yet completed. He claims that 
he originally planned two additional parts to the Principles: one on living things, and 
another on man (AT IX, 310; CSM I, 279). 
127 This is not to say that Descartes has completely disregarded this maxim. It is brought 
up shortly after in a later letter to Elisabeth, dated 15 September 1645 (AT IV, 295; 
CSMK, 267). 
128 AT IV, 253; CSMK, 257. 
129 The Discourse was originally written in French, and thus meant for a broader 
audience than Descartes’ later Latin works. 
130 Descartes does seem to believe that sovereigns have a different relationship with 
ethical study than the commoner (AT V, 87;CSMK, 326). Another factor to consider is 
the private nature of the correspondence. While Descartes’ side of the conversation was 
published in Clerselier’s first edition of Descartes’ letters, Elisabeth’s responses were not 
published for some time. However, despite this, Elisabeth did serve as a patron and 
promoter of Cartesian philosophy (Bos, 2010). 
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 The second maxim also differs considerably from its original form in the 
Discourse. In its earlier form, Descartes decides to, “be as firm and decisive in my 
actions as I could, and to follow even the most doubtful opinions, once I had adopted 
them.”131 Later, to Elisabeth, the “doubtful opinions” are omitted. Instead, we are told to 
“have a firm and constant resolution to carry out whatever reason recommends.”132 
Again, we see the provisional elements removed, replaced with the certainty that reason 
confers. 
Whereas the first two maxims of the Discourse are subjected to extensive revision 
in the letters to Elisabeth, the third maxim’s changes are subtle. In the Discourse, we are 
told to conquer ourselves rather than fortune, but in the letter to Elisabeth, things 
outside our power are not to be desired. Thoughts, being the only thing wholly within 
our control, become the central focus of our lives. However, it should be noted that 
while most changes to the third maxim seem to be minor or even stylistic, Descartes is 
careful to insert a dependence of this slightly revised third rule on the other two 
aforementioned rules. We are led to the third rule, Descartes claims, by conducting 
ourselves in accordance with the previous two. This leaves us assured that by following 
reason and being firm in our judgments, no good not already in our possession is 
outside of our control and, therefore, not worthy of our concern.133 
As mentioned above, while there is little doubt that the provisional morality of 
the Discourse was destined for replacement, we need to seriously consider whether the 
rules given to Elisabeth were meant to be the better rules Descartes had claimed to be 
looking for. Descartes own understanding of the relationship between the later rules 
                                                   
131 AT VI, 24; CSM I, 123.  
132 AT IV, 265; CSMK, 257. 
133 AT IV, 266; CSMK, 258. 
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given to Elisabeth and the provisional code of the Discourse is less than clear. In 
introducing the rules to Elisabeth, Descartes makes an unusually cryptic claim. 
 Or il me semble qu’un chacun se peut render content de soi meme et sans rien 
attendre d’ailleurs, pourvu seulement qu’il observe trois choses, auxquelles se 
raportent les trois regles de morale, qu j’ai mises dans le Discours de la 
Methode.134  
What is of particular interest here is Descartes claim that the three rules to Elisabeth 
“auxquelles se raportent les trois regles de morale.” CSMK translates this key phrase as, 
“which are related to the three rules of morality.” However, this translation may not be 
the most precise. We could also, perhaps more accurately, translate this sentence as, “to 
which the three rules of morality are related,” thus reversing the direction of the 
relationship. While the translation in CSMK seems to imply that the rules to Elisabeth 
emerged from the provisional code of the Discourse, we might just as well say that the 
provisional code emerged from the rules to Elisabeth. This later interpretation would 
give an interesting insight into how seriously and for how long Descartes had been taken 
by his own moral code. The text, however, is simply too ambiguous and scant to 
determine exactly how we should read Descartes’ own account of the relationship 
between the two differing sets of rules. I believe that the revisions, along with Descartes’ 
explicit acknowledgement that they are related but not identical to the first provisional 
code, gives us good cause to accept the second iteration to Elisabeth as part of his 
considered view. We will also see later on that elements of this second code reappear in 
                                                   
134 It seems to me that each person can make himself content by himself without any 
external assistance, provided he respects three conditions, which are related to the three 
rules of morality which I put forward in the Discourse on Method (AT IV, 265; CSMK, 
257)(emphasis added). 
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the Passions, further bolstering the argument that we should take the second version of 
the provisional code as permanent. 
III. The Problem: The Purely Mental Nature of Descartes’ Ethics 
 Accepting that the provisional ethical code has taken on a more permanent 
nature by August of 1645 does not necessarily entail that it is remotely close to the 
“highest and most perfect morality;” instead, we should take it as a necessary 
component. The method, therefore, can be to take the code presented to Elisabeth as 
part of Descartes’ considered view and use it as a test case to square this position with 
Descartes repeated claims that his physics informs the foundation his ethics. In other 
words, if we can connect the second iteration of the provisional code somehow with 
Descartes’ physics, we are on good footing to indicate how Descartes envisioned the 
interconnectedness of his natural philosophy. However, the connection is less than 
clear. Even if we were to take the earlier code of the Discourse, there is no more obvious 
avenue to connect them directly to his physics. Both of Descartes’ sets of rules seem to 
be exclusively concerned with either the will or the intellect, which neatly exclude any 
direct connection with Cartesian physics, since those are faculties that clearly fall 
exclusively under the mind’s purview.135 
We might attempt to forge a connection by noting that the nature of the will and 
intellect are discovered through Descartes’ metaphysics and epistemology. These two 
branches of Cartesian natural philosophy in turn serve as the grounding for his physics, 
thus indirectly connecting physics to ethics. However, this interpretation simply does 
not get the intended dependence between physics and ethics aligned in the correct 
                                                   
135 There are other faculties, however, that have both a mental and physical element—
memory and imagination, for example, require the brain as well as the mind. 
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manner. If we take this route, morals have simply circumvented his physics and are 
neither dependent nor informed by it. Instead, morals are simply formed by some of the 
same core principles. In short, under this reading we could maintain metaphysics, cut 
out physics all together, and not suffer any loss. On the other hand, we might attempt to 
bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundation of his ethics and the material 
aspect of his physics through the third rule of the provisional code, which instructs us to 
not desire things outside of our control. Here there might be a hidden implication that 
refers back to knowledge of Cartesian physics, insofar as his physics would be able to 
help us delimit how much of the physical realm is within our control.  
Yet even this modest hypothesis seems to be directly contradicted by Descartes 
himself. From the Discourse we can gather that it is only our thoughts that are 
completely within our control—something that seems entirely consistent with the 
general stoic theme running throughout most of Descartes’ moral musings.136 While we 
might do our best to obtain those things external to us, Descartes position is that they 
should be subject to chance more than our will, and consequently, we should stoically 
resist desiring them.  
The scope of what is within our control is further refined in the Passions of the 
Soul. Instead of the broad category of our thoughts being the only thing within our 
control, Descartes clarifies that it is exclusively our will.137 This reinforces our initial 
problem. The will, a faculty entirely contained by the immaterial mind and thus the 
                                                   
136 AT VI, 25; CSM I, 123. 
137 AT XI, 446; CSM I, 384. It is, however, if we are being charitable, it is likely that 
Descartes never held that all thoughts were under our control, as implied in the 
Discourse, but instead only a subset. Later, in the Principles, we can see a distinction 
between two types of thoughts, those within our control, and those outside of it (AT IX, 
64; CSM I, 223). This distinction becomes important in establishing the reality of 
external objects via God qua non-deceiver in the Meditations as well.  
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subject of metaphysics, lends little room for any connection with the physical (i.e. the 
realm of physics). Elisabeth herself is quick to point out the intellectualist character of 
Descartes’ morals, which she seems to take as independent of the body when 
considering the nature of happiness. 
The immortality of the soul, and knowing that it is much more noble than the 
body, is capable of making us seek out death, as well as it can make us despise it, 
because we would not know how to doubt that we will live more happily, excepted 
from sicknesses and passions of the body.138 
Here Elisabeth is rightly keying in on Descartes’ lack of reference to the body, external 
objects, or the physical world in general, as playing any role at all in human 
happiness.139 Indeed, the third rule of Descartes’ morality seems to expressly exclude 
such a role. Descartes’ response to this powerful objection equally fails to make any such 
connection. Instead of relating happiness and his moral system to the world, he gives a 
relatively unimaginative skeptical argument: we have no reason to think that the next 
life is better than our own, and no real reason to believe that the world we actually 
inhabit is in fact bad. Descartes goes even further to marginalize happiness to the mind 
in claiming, “true philosophy, on the contrary, teaches that even amid the saddest 
disasters and most bitter pains we can always be happy [content], provided that we 
know how to use our reason.”140 The reduction of happiness, and therefore morals, to 
the realm of the spiritual (i.e., the mind) seems to be complete.  
                                                   
138 AT IV, 302. 
139 A similar argument is found in Elisabeth’s letter to Descartes from 18 October 1645 
(AT IV, 323). 
140 AT IV, 315; CSMK, 272. 
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 The separation of the mind from bodily needs and discomforts is, of course, 
nothing new in the history of philosophy. Stoic philosophers have long advocated a very 
similar position and Descartes was familiar with and influenced by at least some of the 
great stoic thinkers.141 However, if this is to be Descartes’ position as an ethical thinker, 
there would be no way to connect this train of thought to his often repeated claim that 
his ultimate ethical theory will depend on his physics. This has led most commentators 
to assume either, that the purported connection between ethics and physics was simply 
typical bluster from a philosopher who was not exactly prone to modesty, or none of 
Descartes’ ethical writings should be considered as his actual theory.142 
 There is one other possible interpretation that deserves mention. In a letter to 
Elisabeth, Descartes gives us what could be a solution to our problem.143 
 It may be useful to judge worthily of the works of God and to have a vast idea of 
the extent of the universe, such as I tried to convey in the third book of my 
Principles. For if we imagine that beyond the heavens there is nothing but 
imaginary spaces, and that all the heavens are made only for the service of the 
earth, and the earth only for man, we will be inclined to think that this earth is 
our principal abode and this life our best. Instead of discovering the perfection 
that are truly within us, we will attribute to other creatures imperfections which 
they do not possess, so as to raise ourselves above them, and we will be so 
                                                   
141 Deborah Brown, in her book Descartes and the Passionate Mind, argues that 
Descartes is situated between two traditions: Aristotelianism and Stoicism. While I do 
not disagree with her conclusion here, I will argue that these traditions are not the 
exclusive influences, or necessarily the most important ones. As will become clear, we 
need to look more broadly to the medical tradition to be able to explain large portions of 
the Passions. 
142 See Morgan (1994, p. 24-25). 
143 Shapiro (2008, p. 456-457) seems to make just such a connection. 
65 
 
absurdly presumptuous as to wish to be long to God’s council…and this will bring 
us countless vain anxieties and troubles. 
Here Descartes seems to be suggesting that through contemplation of the world and the 
laws that govern it, we gain some humility. In short, through the study of physics we can 
potentially become more ethical beings.  
I would like to caution against such a direct connection between Cartesian ethics 
and physics for two reasons. First, Descartes only says that it might be useful, whereas 
when discussing the most perfect ethics he claims that the connection would assume 
knowledge of physics. Second, when we look back toward the tree of philosophy analogy 
from the Principles, Descartes not only says that the most perfect ethics would require 
physics and metaphysics, but also a knowledge of all the other sciences—mechanics and 
medicine being the principal ones. Thus even if this passage were to connect a small 
portion of Descartes’ physics to ethical contemplation, it still has not satisfied the 
further condition of connecting medicine and mechanics. 
IV. Beginning to Bridge the Gap: The Passions and Descartes the 
Doctor 
To address this apparent tension, we should turn now to the Passions as a 
possible bridge stretching from physics to ethics and examine exactly how this fits into 
the general philosophic project laid out so neatly in the tree of philosophy analogy of the 
Principles. When looking at the Passions, the significant amount of attention Descartes 
pays to the bodily processes that accompany the mental phenomena of the passions is 
immediately apparent. The work is filled with descriptions of various changes in the 
circulation of blood, movements of the heart, and skin coloration, among many other 
physiological observations. In this regard, it is necessary to not only view the Passions 
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written by a philosopher, but also as one that is written as physician. Many of these 
descriptions come from Descartes’ own experiments, dissections, and observations, all 
of which indicate an enduring interest in medicine. As early as 1630, seven years before 
the first publication of the Discourse, Descartes writes to Marin Mersenne, informing 
him of his recent studies in anatomy and pathology.144 Indeed, there are times when 
Descartes claims the pursuit of medicine as his primary goal.145 Of course, Descartes’ 
interest in medicine is not completely selfless, as he initially was concerned with 
prolonging his own life indefinitely—although he slowly lowers his aspirations on this 
front over his career. Several excellent commentators have stressed the fact that 
Descartes’ interest and skill in medicine was neither a passing phase nor ignored by his 
contemporaries—he was, after all, invited to take up the chair in theoretical medicine at 
the University of Bologna, even before the Discourse was published.146 Descartes’ closest 
allies were also keenly aware of his dedication to the study of medicine. In Clerselier’s 
first edition of Descartes’ letters, for example, he chose to emphasize a selection of 
letters on the topic to further promote Descartes’ legacy. 
 Whether or not Descartes had any formal training in medicine is unknown. 
However, throughout his career he often offers advice to his correspondents on matters 
                                                   
144 AT I, 137. 
145 In the Discourse on Method Descartes announced his plan to, “devote the rest of my 
life to nothing other than trying to acquire some knowledge of nature which we may 
derives rules in medicine” (AT VI, 78; CSM I, 151). Later, in a 1645 letter to the 
Marquess of Newcastle, he states that, “the preservation of health has always been the 
principal end of my studies” (AT IV, 329; CSMK, 275). 
146 While not much is known about how Descartes’ name came up for consideration for 
the chair, or even if he received the offer at all, the most information can be found in 
Manning (2014). Vincent Aucante also makes an excellent case for Descartes’ enduring 
passion for medicine, even claiming that 20% of Descartes extant corpus is medical in 
nature. 
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of health147 and regularly warns his friends of the quackery common among the 
physicians of the day.148 He also warns of the dangers of blood-letting, among other such 
“remedies.”149 While Descartes derides the uninformed and unsuccessful practices of 
physicians, and instead counsels that one’s own experience should be trusted over 
authority. 
I share the opinion of Tiberius, who was inclined to think that everyone over 
thirty had enough experience of what was harmful or beneficial to be his own 
doctor. Indeed it seems to me that anybody who has any intelligence, and who is 
willing to pay a little attention to his health, can better observe what is beneficial 
to it than the most learned doctors.150 
Descartes further claims, in the preface to the Description of the Human Body that, 
“there is no more fruitful exercise than attempting to know ourselves.”151 However, while 
Descartes expressly claims to be his own teacher regarding medicine, he was not 
completely ignorant of medical studies. Descartes had read Jean Fernel, who we will 
discuss later; he was, famously, an early advocate of Harvey and the circulation of the 
blood; and even studied such seemingly esoteric subjects as chicken embryology as early 
as 1631.152 Yet, despite his open contempt for the status of medicine in his day, Steven 
                                                   
147 See AT IV, 565 and AT IV, 588 for two excellent examples of Descartes’ medical 
advice to Clerselier and Princess Elisabeth. 
148 This was a fairly common criticism of the day, see Pender (2006). 
149 AT IV, 588. 
150 AT IV, 329-330; CSMK, 275-276 and again later in the Conversation with Burman, 
51. 
151 AT XI, 223; CSM I, 314. 
152 Descartes claims in 1646 to have read De formatione ovi et pulli 15 years prior (AT 
IV, 555).  
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Shapin points out that most of the medical advice that Descartes gives to his 
correspondents could be commonly found in the works of Galenic physicians.153 
It will hopefully become clear throughout the remaining sections that this intense 
interest in medicine, broadly construed, cannot be removed from the context of the 
Passions, neither can it be removed from the context of Descartes’ ethical theorizing.154 
With all this in in mind, I will defend two claims. First, that the Passions is a work 
almost exclusively concerned with the bodily, thus we cannot easily view it as ethical 
work that neatly fits in Descartes’ framework as we have discussed. In this way, the 
Passions is more a medical work than anything else. Second, I will contend that the 
medical in Descartes’ corpus represents a different type of ethical theory—one where 
experimental, observational, and anatomical study are all relevant—thus, we can 
reconnect the Passions with his ethics, albeit in a non-traditional way. In essence, my 
claim is that Descartes engages in creating an ethical system for the mind-body union, 
not just the mind. 
 While traditionally the Passions is treated solely as an ethical treatise, insisting 
that the Passions be viewed primarily as a medical work is not entirely novel. For 
example, Nancy Struever has suggested making a direct connection between the 
Passions and medicine by translating Descartes’ own claim to be writing as a 
“physicien” as a “physician.”155 I have been unable to find a period dictionary that would 
                                                   
153 Shapin (2000, 149). 
154 The connection between modern natural philosophy and medicine is only now 
beginning to be appreciated. See Smith (2016) for an excellent defense of why medical 
views should be seen as philosophically relevant in cases like Descartes and Leibniz. 
155 Struever (1993, p. 197). 
69 
 
help substantiate this translation, but it is not completely without merit.156 During 
Descartes’ time, although it varied greatly by country, it was not uncommon first to 
receive an education in natural philosophy before continuing on to medicine.157 
Physicians were often expected to have some knowledge of the physics of the day, and in 
essence, physics was indeed part and parcel of medicine. Yet, this alone is not enough to 
fully substantiate the reading I would like to pursue.  
On this subject, two remarks should be made. First, even though physics was part 
of medical pedagogy during the time, Descartes did not see himself as part of that 
tradition, and he was all too eager to distance himself from the perceived quackery 
around him. This is evidenced by his frequent derision of medical doctors and his claim 
that the Passions was breaking ground in a new direction. Compared to his 
predecessors, Descartes believed he was connecting physics to the Passions in an utterly 
novel manner.158 Secondly, we need to recognize that what Descartes considered physics 
to be, under a broadly mechanical worldview, was often at odds with the scholastic 
physics that would have been taught to medical doctors. Thus when Descartes insists he 
is speaking qua physician, we need to be considering something intended to be 
significantly different from the traditional physics taught in his day. In short insisting 
                                                   
156 However, in the 1694 edition of the Dictionaire de l’académie française, “physician” 
is defined as “one who knows physics [la physique];” later physics [physique] is defined 
as knowledge of natural things with a telling example given, “physics [la physique] is 
necessary for the physician [médicin].” 
157 See Brockliss’ French Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries: A Cultural History.  
158 “The defects of the sciences we have from the ancients are nowhere more apparent 
than in their writings on the passions…That is why I shall be obliged to write just as if I 
were considering a topic that no one had dealt with before me (AT XI, 327-328; CSM I, 
328). 
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that Descartes was writing as a physician is simply forcing him into a context that he 
was explicitly trying to reject. 
On the other hand, before discounting the ethical content normally supposed in 
Passions, we should first outline the problems of such a reading. A great deal of recent 
literature on the Passions has focused primarily on the scant portions dealing with 
ethical language, to the detriment of a fuller understanding of the exact role the copious 
amounts of physiological observations play. This emphasis on the ethical has even led 
some to almost entirely disregard any of the physiological remarks. For example, Lisa 
Shapiro goes so far as to express that Descartes simply spends an “inordinate amount of 
time detailing the physiology of the passions.”159 However, I will argue that if we take a 
closer look at the context surrounding Descartes’ Passions, we can see that the 
physiological comments play a central role to a project that is embedded in the context 
of similar treatises on the passions of his day. Further, I will argue that without the 
physiological underpinnings, Descartes’ theory of the Passions as a practical science is 
left incomplete and lacking any substantial connection to his physics.160 
V. Two Cases to Guide an Interpretation: Juan-Luis Vives and Jean 
Fernal  
 It is easy to understand Shapiro’s complaint regarding the voluminous nature of 
Descartes’ physiological comments; at times, they can seem repetitive, are often 
completely false, and do not neatly fit the mold of stoic treatises on passions that 
                                                   
159 Shapiro (2003, p. 50).  
160 Descartes most clearly expresses that all sciences after metaphysics and physics will 
be useful and have some particular end in his often quoted tree analogy in the preface to 
the French version of the Principles (AT IX, 14).  
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typically come to mind when considering the topic.161 From this angle, Descartes’ work 
begins to look like a disjointed anomaly or a treatise without a context. However, to 
justify my interpretation and begin to adjust the lens through which we view the 
Passions, I propose setting two distinct stakes in the ground to orient my interpretation; 
namely, the works of Juan-Luis Vives, and Jean Fernel. These two authors are 
important for this discussion for two reasons. First, it is known that Descartes had read 
both of these authors and there is no question that they had a degree of influence of him. 
Vives is one of the very few authors explicitly cited in the Passions, while Fernel is 
mentioned in Descartes’ correspondence as an important authority in areas of medicine. 
Fernel’s reputation is held in such high regard that Descartes claims him as, “an 
authority that can be used in opposition to other authorities.”162 The second reason to 
consider these thinkers is that they highlight just how diverse of a subject the passions 
of the soul were during Descartes’ time and the scope of his own depth of knowledge on 
the subject. Fernel, for example, was a 16th century doctor who wrote extensively on 
physiology, pathology, the treatment of illnesses, as well as on the different types of 
souls and their corresponding passions. In contrast, Vives was a Spanish-born, 16th 
century humanist, whose work dealt primarily with metaphysics and morals. While 
these two authors come from wildly different backgrounds and deal with very dissimilar 
subjects, they do share some overlap with regards to the passions. This overlap will in 
turn help justify the reading I would like to give of Descartes’ ethical work, showing that 
this avenue was both open, well-trodden. 
                                                   
161 See Rutherford (2004) and Shapiro (2008). 
162 Descartes to Plempius, 15 February 1638 (AT I, 533). We know from this same letter 
that Descartes certainly read Fernel’s Pathology, but it is likely he read his other works, 
as they were widely circulated at the time. 
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i. Vives 
 To move chronologically, we can begin with Vives, whose primary discussion of 
the passions of the soul comes in the third book of De Anima et Vita titled Passions of 
the Soul, published in 1538. Unlike many thinkers dealing with the passions, including 
Descartes himself, Vives does not offer any precise taxonomy of the passions and his 
discussion on this topic can seem rather disorderly and fragmented at times. However, 
Vives offers unusual clarity in presenting the goal for a detailed study of the passions, 
claiming it is “necessary for remedying grave evils and providing medication for severe 
diseases.”163 The moral overtones, while ambiguous in the stated goal, are quite hard to 
miss later in the book—after all, while the first half of book three is dedicated to a study 
of the passions as they contribute to our humanity, the second half is entirely dedicated 
to treating the passions in man as “a dreadful and cruel beast.”164 
 For Vives, the passions are defined as being our natural faculties, given by God, 
that serve to help us seek out good and avoid evil. Thus, the passions perform a definite 
function; yet, we are warned they provide only practical information as to how we view 
the world, not how the world truly is. Much like we see in Descartes, the intellect is 
needed to regulate information from the passions. Furthering the vital role of the 
passions, Vives even goes so far as to claim explicitly against the Stoics that the 
possession of certain passions is what makes us human and is necessary for living a 
moral life. For example, when speaking of the possibility of living without sympathy 
Vives vehemently retorts, “this is not only impossible but completely inhuman, since 
                                                   
163 Vives (1989, p. 1). Disease is most likely not referring to a physical disease. Instead 
Vives speaks of diseases of the soul as affections reinforced by experience. (p. 5) 
164 Vives (1989, p. 60). 
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compassion is born from the similarity and affinity between human souls.”165 Further 
developing this “similarity and affinity,” Vives defines sympathy and love as having two 
characteristics. First, we feel love or sympathy for others because we see similarities 
between the objects of love and ourselves—indeed, we see others we love as extensions 
of ourselves.166 Second, because they are seen as part of ourselves, love and sympathy 
serve as internal motivations toward benevolent actions toward them, albeit quasi-
egotistical benevolence.167 
 It is clear in Vives’ treatment of the passions that some of them are to be valued 
as useful and informative emotions but only when properly moderated (even love needs 
to be resisted to some degree from an early age). In contrast, some passions such as 
sadness, fear, and pride, are entirely negative and always to be avoided. Vives’ 
discussion of the origin of passions and appropriate therapy to moderate them is 
significantly less clear, although he does offer some advice, which we will discuss later. 
Interestingly, and like Descartes, Vives often intermingles physiological comments 
within his discussion of the passions; however, there is no clear methodology for when 
he finds physiological observations pertinent. Sadness, for example, is claimed to cause 
black bile, dry up the body, and contract the heart. The effect of this black bile in turn is 
to “darken our minds” and make our souls lifeless.168 Similarly, anger is discussed in 
terms of blood, heat, and its negative effects on the body.169 In contrast, pleasure is 
                                                   
165 Vives (1989, p.47). 
166 In this regard, Vives seems to be paralleling Aristotle’s views on friendship. 
167 There seem to be strong parallels here to Descartes’ own theory of love, which 
describes it as one considering himself “from the present as joined with what we love.” 
For a more complete account of some of the background of Descartes’ theory of love, see 
Frigo (2016). 
168 Vives (1989, p. 94-95). 
169 Vives (1989, p. 68). 
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defined solely in terms of the contentment of the will with its proper good.170 While 
there is no clear demarcation between physical passions and non-physical passions, they 
each have different ends: the former is important for achieving bodily harmony, while 
the latter is important for achieving spiritual harmony. Both of these aspects ultimately 
make up a moral being for Vives. 
ii.  Fernel 
 In his work entitled Pathology, Fernel begins his discussions of the passions with 
a much more obviously medical bent. He begins with the overtly pessimistic claim that 
because the passions can never be truly conquered, they must be seen as evident and 
necessary causes of sicknesses.171 As a medical doctor, it is clear that much of Fernel’s 
interest in the passions is centered on treating the passions as both the causes and 
outward signs of human illness. Unlike Vives, who dealt with physiological matters only 
sporadically, Fernel is consistent in focusing on the bodily effects and causes of the 
passions. On this note, all the passions have a negative role in one’s health and should 
be avoided as much as possible—as we will see later, Descartes agrees with the passions 
playing a role in one’s health, but firmly denies that they are wholly negative. Fernel’s 
position is fairly unique, relative to these three thinkers, as even moderated passions 
play no positive role for one’s health and are to be categorically avoided.172 The lone 
exception to this is joy, which is said to dilate the heart, and is only sometimes beneficial 
to one’s health.173  
 Fernel is also significantly more methodical than Vives in his classification of the 
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171 Fernel (1646, p. 68). 
172 Fernel (1646, p. 68). 
173 Fernel (1646, p. 68). 
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passions. While, like Vives, Fernel does not adopt the standard scholastic division of the 
passions into concupiscible and irascible, he does include a basic taxonomy of primitive 
passions: fear, sadness, anger, joy, shame, and anxiety.174 All other passions are 
derivative of these basic six. Fernel also provides a means of systematically addressing 
immoderate passions. According to Fernel, passions are classified as appetites that do 
not involve the use of reason and have a natural seat in the body itself. Among the 
irrational appetites, not considered as passions, are violent desires, whose seats are in 
the liver, testicles, and stomach; while the passions proper have a seat in the heart. 
Fernel’s evidence for the physical location of violent desires and the passions comes 
from diagnosing disorders that are associated with them. For example, when one is in 
the throes of rage, Fernel claims the heart is noticeably oppressed. Because the seat of 
these passions is in the body, the remedy for the passions is simply a physical treatment 
of the heart. Thus, immoderate passions receive similar physical treatment as any other 
physical ailment. For example, fear, melancholy, and sadness, can be alleviated with a 
particular type of apple juice, which he claims helps to remove palpitations in the 
heart.175 Furthering this naturalistic bent, again in opposition to Vives, Fernel claims 
that all are brought about by physical causes. For example, blood boiling up in the heart 
brings about anger, hostility and vengeance. If left untreated, these physical causes of 
passions, bring about even further problems, such as causing serious disease when they 
become entrenched in our veins and marrows.176 
VI. Descartes and the Passions: Taxonomy, Function, and Treatment 
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175 Fernel (1668 p. 335). 
176 Fernel (1668p. 485). 
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While I am going to emphasize some of the similarities between Vives, Fernel and 
Descartes, I should first point out some of the most striking differences. Descartes’ 
trademark insistence on clarity and order, results in significantly more methodical 
definitions and classifications of the passions. Descartes is also carefully to seperate the 
passions from other kinds of perceptions, where Vives and Fernel take it as a given. 
From this early emphasis on classification and ordering of the passions, Descartes is 
able to delineate his precise interest in passions of the soul as opposed to perceptions or, 
in other words, bodily passions.177 Regarding the division between passions and general 
perceptions, Descartes’ discussion relies on common sense, or common opinion, to 
differentiate between mere perceptions from passions of the soul. In §25 of the 
Passions, Descartes restricts the term ‘passions’ to refer only to those things that we 
generally take as being located in the soul itself.178 Other perceptions, carried by the 
nerves, which we generally take to be located somewhere within our corporeal bodies, 
are not to be considered passions proper. For example, a pinprick on one’s finger would 
be considered merely a perception, as we would generally say that the pain feels as if it 
were in our finger. However, the anxiety that preceded the pinprick, seemingly 
impossible to localize, would generally be considered as having its seat within our soul. 
To be sure, this distinction is a bit fuzzy and it is odd that Descartes would make such a 
loose distinction based on our initial intuitions or reactions. This is especially 
paradoxical given the many obvious potential problems in using common opinions, or 
first impressions, in establishing one’s taxonomy (i.e. phantom limb pain, “prejudiced” 
                                                   
177 By “bodily passion” I mean only to section off feelings of hunger, thirst, and pain, as 
Descartes does. These differ from most other perceptions as, according to Descartes, we 
generally tend to locate them within the body and dealing with the body’s functions. 
178 Les perception qu’on raporte seulement à l’ame, sont celle don’t on sent les effets 
comme en l’ame mesme (AT XI, 347). 
77 
 
people believing that color is in the object not the perceiver, love is in the heart, etc.). 
Further, even though we generally have the first impression that our passions cannot be 
localized, after study, we might find that many of our passions have strictly bodily 
causes. Indeed, for Descartes, many passions have their origins in the heart. While the 
close connection between the body and the soul results in an odd doubling of passions 
(i.e. a bodily representation of a passion and a mental representation of a passion), these 
anatomical observations are superseded by the phenomenological as the guiding 
criterion for Descartes’ taxonomy.  
Distinguishing the passions from perceptions through our common opinion of 
their perceived location is, however, quite important for Descartes’ general strategy of 
the Passions. A passion of the soul consists of two parts: first, the bodily movements 
(including animal spirits and motions of the organs), and second, the thoughts that are 
attached to these bodily movements. As we will see later on, these two halves of the 
passions are not necessarily connected in any way, instead they are contingently 
conjoined depending on the individual’s own physiology. In keeping the distinction 
between the two as fairly amorphous and dependent on perception, Descartes is able to 
keep the connection between the soul and body equally mysterious, all while still 
considering it to be an object of scientific study. While there is certainly a tight 
connection between the mind and body, how they interact or how a thought becomes 
conjoined with a bodily state needs to remain somewhat arbitrary. If the distinction 
between the two were to gain some objective standard, say in a bodily process, then the 
body would determine the soul absolutely. This in turn would put us in the same 
category as soulless animal-machines. The phenomenological aspect of the passions is 
therefore necessary to defining passions as the physical aspect it is correlated to needs to 
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have the ability to vary. As I will be arguing later, this division is also part of the solution 
to how we can connect Descartes’ ethical writings to his physics.  
With this methodological taxonomy in place, Descartes is able to move to 
discussing the role passions play. He claims that the function of the passions is “that 
they dispose our soul to want the things which nature deems useful for us, and to persist 
in this volition.”179 These things that nature deems useful for us seem to be entirely 
bodily and have health as their end. Fear, for example, prepares the body to flee danger; 
while cheerfulness informs us we are in good health.180 Thus the passions fill a vital role 
for Descartes, informing the mind with regards to how to preserve the body—something 
it would be clueless of on its own.181 As we saw, Fernel assigns little to no positive 
function to the passions; although, the passions can serve as outward signs of an 
oncoming sickness. This might seem to be quite positive if the passions themselves were 
not considered to equally be the cause of the sickness they signal. Vives’ position, 
however, is strikingly similar to Descartes’. Vives claims, “[Passions] are spurs to move 
the soul this or that way, [and] reins to restrain it from running into the harmful.”182 
While standard stoic treatises claim that passions should be eliminated, Vives presents 
an immediate precursor to Descartes’ on claim that passions have desirable content. Yet, 
while all passions for Vives are about some good or some evil, some passions lead 
toward vice or virtue depending on their object. In contrast, Descartes insists that he 
finds almost all passions to be wholly good. According to Descartes, the extent that the 
                                                   
179 CSM, 349; AT IX, 372. 
180 CSM, 343; AT IX, 359 and CSM 361; AT IX, 399. 
181 Many of the so-called “rationalists” of the modern period fully accepted that 
questions of health, diet, and medication need to be discovered empirically; see Smith 
(2016, 332-338). 
182 Vives (1989, p. 4). 
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passions do err is a question of degree to which they impel the will, not a function of 
their objects. 
Regarding treatment of the passions, there is a sizeable degree of similarity 
between all three thinkers not found in the traditional stoic and scholastic context 
associated with Descartes. Descartes gives several means of alleviating the negative 
effects of the passions. At the end of part two of the Passions, Descartes claims that 
pursuing virtue is the chief remedy against the passions. However, it is important to 
note that Descartes’ definition of virtue is less than traditional. In §144, he notes “the 
pursuit of virtue consists in doing the good things that depend on us.” He later defines it 
in §148 as “[living] in such a way that his conscience cannot reproach him for ever 
failing to do something he judges to be the best.” This is a close echo of one of Vives’ 
remarks, citing firm judgment as a means to avoid unnecessary agitation. However, 
Vives also suggests distraction, even by strong drinks or blood-letting to reduce the 
strength of overwhelming passions. In this regard, Vives’ scattered comments for 
regulating the passions are fairly noteworthy in that they advocate both mental and 
physical remedies. Fernel, as we have already seen, advocated strictly physical remedies. 
For Descartes, exactly how to classify his remedies is a bit murkier of a question, 
although I will argue that like Vives and Fernel, we should see the physical playing a 
central role. 
When we examine Descartes’ chief remedy against the excesses of the passions, 
pursuing virtue, it appears as though much of Descartes’ therapy against the passions 
resides within the mind alone—specifically the will. However, at least part of the 
solution to mastering the passions must necessarily be bodily at its core. In §141 
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Descartes fundamentally limits his interest in the nature of the relationship between the 
passions of the soul and the body. 
If we had no body, I venture to say we could not go too far in abandoning 
ourselves to love and joy, or in avoiding hatred and sadness. But the bodily 
movements accompanying these passions may all be injurious to health when 
they are very violent; on the other hand, they may be beneficial to it when they 
are only moderate.  
This makes it clear that when we are correctly moderating our passions, our bodies are 
physically healthy. A sure sign that the passions are disordered is sickness or disease in 
the body. Further, we can begin to see that if we want to consider Descartes’ treatment 
of the passions as a moral treatise, we must recognize that knowledge of the body and its 
health is central to the project. 
Later in the Passions, Descartes makes a new claim that the general cure to 
excessive passion is generosity. Here again we must be careful to note how Descartes 
defines his terms. In §153 Descartes elaborates on exactly what he takes generosity to 
be: “First…knowing that nothing truly belongs to him but his freedom to dispose his 
volitions…[and] second…his feeling within himself a firm and constant resolution to use 
[his will] well.” So, generosity looks very similar to what was previously defined simply 
as “pursuing virtue.”183 However, to fully connect Descartes’ claim that “pursuing virtue” 
is the cure to excessive passions back to the body, we need only look to his account of 
how thoughts become attached to particular movements of the animal spirits and how 
the will interacts with the body. Descartes’ answers to these problems are not tailored to 
                                                   
183 Rodis-Lewis (1987) does an excellent job connecting this claim to previous ones 
made by Descartes. She is also quite thorough in documenting its connections with 
Descartes various claim on free will—a topic too broad to address here. 
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any specific human, but instead he presents an abstract method that can be applied to 
each person. He does this because each person would need to take into account their 
own particular physiological and mental properties. Thus, in connecting the body to the 
mind Descartes must at the same time account for how it is possible that the same 
bodily state can produce different effects in different people. His answer to this is 
twofold. First, some people’s brains are simply constructed differently, which gives the 
animal spirits different paths to follow, resulting in different responses to certain 
stimuli.184 The second part of his answer leaves a bit more room for interpretation. 
Descartes reasons that when we are first introduced to a certain movement of the animal 
spirits there is some variation on which thought becomes associated with it. It is unclear 
if these variations allow for some action of the will, or if it is simply repeating the earlier 
claim pointing to different physical developments resulting in different effects. 
However, in both cases, once a thought is joined to a certain movement of the animal 
spirits, it is permanently joined to it. The result is that we simply cannot will our 
passions away, or reassign them to different thoughts. Instead, Descartes’ solution is 
discovering workarounds aimed at counteracting the particular flow of animal spirits. 
Accomplishing this is described through the analogy of attempting to enlarge one’s 
pupils. It is not sufficient to merely will one’s pupils larger, which would be futile by 
itself. Instead the effect of enlarging one’s pupil can easily be achieved by directing one’s 
gaze far into the distance.185 Thus directing the will in indirect ways can serve to alter 
the course of the animal spirits toward achieving the outcome of the second order 
intention. 
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 The most import element of this workaround strategy is Descartes’ claim that 
thoughts can affect the passions, but only insofar as they affect the body. If the 
particular movement of animal spirits that cause a particular passion is present, then 
the thought will naturally be present as well. Changing our thoughts can only affect the 
motion of the pineal gland, which in turn can affect the animal spirits; however, we must 
determine which movement of the gland correctly counteracts the movement of the 
spirits, which can only be discovered empirically. In short, while having firm and 
resolute judgment is effective, it is only successful insofar as it has the correct physical 
effect, which is a contingent fact. In other words, if we are unable to correctly adjust the 
flow of animal spirits, the passion will persist—willing a passion away is not sufficient. 
Further, given the subjectivity of how passions are connected to thought, there is no 
guarantee that Descartes’ solution will work for everyone. In short, the bodily aspects of 
the passions, like in Vives and Fernel, cannot be ignored. As I will argue, it is these 
bodily aspects of curing passions and the passions negative effects that, like his 
predecessors, are necessary for Descartes’ ethics to gain any traction. 
VII. Returning to the Problem 
 The common theme we can see running through Descartes’ treatment of ethics is 
being steadfast in one’s decision. This appears as being “firm” in one’s actions in the two 
versions of the provisional code, and later as “generosity,” or “pursuing virtue” in the 
Passions. But the problem still remains: if this is the entirety of Descartes’ ethics, then it 
pertains only to the strength of the will, which appears to entirely remove any possible 
importance for any study of physics, let alone medicine and mechanics, as described in 
the tree analogy. However, the Passions adds considerably to the provisional morality in 
that firmness in judgment and action is not merely valued for its role in coming to truth; 
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instead, it is invoked in relation to the causal relationship not only between the body 
and mind, but also between the mind and body. Just as revealing is the workaround 
strategy Descartes endorses for counteracting the passions. If Descartes ethical theory is 
purely mental, why bother mastering the bodily aspects of the passions at all—especially 
if it requires us to expend a fair amount of mental energy and consideration? The 
answer is relatively straightforward: the mind body union is so tight that the needs of 
the body simply cannot be ignored. Descartes points out exactly how tight this 
connection is in the Meditations.  
For my experience was that these ideas came to me quite without my consent, so 
that I could not have sensory awareness of any object, even if I wanted to, unless it 
was present to my sense organs; and I could not avoid having sensory awareness 
of it when it was present.186 
This is a position Descartes retains throughout the Passions. In short, the body cannot 
fail to impose itself on the mind, which brings about part of the need for a treatise on the 
passions in the first place—physiology included. 
 Much of Descartes’ solution presented in the Passions is a means to train oneself 
to impose the mind over the body more effectively. Through the workaround method 
and pursuing virtue one should be able to begin to redirect various blood flows to reduce 
the overpowering effect of certain passions. But if we accept this, it is still unclear how 
the Passions is to connect back to the ethics of the Discourse and correspondence, as the 
end goal is just affecting a bodily state and health. As I have pointed out earlier on, it is 
always important to pay very close attention to Descartes is using his terminology in the 
Passions, since he often takes what we would normally consider to be ethically laden 
                                                   
186 CSM II, 52; AT VII, 75. 
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language (i.e. “virtue”) and subverts it (i.e. using it merely to denote having a firm 
resolution or to use one’s faculty of reasoning well). Along these lines, it is very tempting 
to classify the Passions simply as a medical text, keeping in mind the great lengths 
Descartes goes to in detailing the physiological aspects of the passions, not to mention 
the great advantages an adept control of the passions would provide for maintaining the 
health of the body machine.  
 To return the Passions and its remedies back to the ethical discussion we need to 
make yet one more diversion through the Meditations and Descartes’ understanding of 
a free will.  
 In order to be free, there is no need for me to be inclined both ways; on the 
contrary, the more I incline to one direction—either because I clearly understand 
that reason of truth and goodness point that way, or because of a divinely 
produced disposition of my inmost thoughts—the freer is my choice.187 
In other words, Descartes affirms here in Meditation IV that the will that is the freest is 
the one that conforms the most to reason. Now, it seems apparent that this type of 
freedom is of central importance to both the provisional moral code and later his 
concept of generosity, given their dependence on firm judgment and following reason. 
Thus we can start to tie these disparate themes in the Passions and other moral 
writings. The final missing piece to the puzzle comes in a letter to Elisabeth from May of 
1646. 
                                                   
187 CSM II, 40; AT VII, 57. 
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I agree that remedies against excessive passions are difficult to practice, and also 
that they are insufficient to prevent bodily disorders; but they may suffice to 
prevent the soul being troubled by them and losing its free judgment.188 
This type of argument, that your mood and bodily state have a direct impact on your 
reasoning ability and further your capacity to follow whatever that ability dictates, was 
common at the time and found readily in both Montaigne and Charron.189 Thus, control 
of the passions is indeed relevant to our ability to reason and, consequently, to our very 
freedom. 
 In short, f to be an ethical being we must learn a great deal about our own bodies 
to ensure we can correctly follow that path prescribed to us by reason. Given that the 
physical aspects of passions can and do effect our mental states, even to the point of 
overwhelming us, we must learn how to control them. To do this, we must perform 
dissections, study the nervous system, blood flow, and the heart—just what Descartes 
did and partly conveyed in the Passions. To further understand how these various 
biological systems function, we must first understand the basic principles of mechanics. 
The motion of the muscles, organs, and veins, are nothing more than the simple 
machines outlined in Descartes’ various treatise on mechanics. The knowledge of 
Cartesian physics is also essential for the task. For example, to understand the Cartesian 
description of the nervous system, we must recognize the various properties of subtle 
matter (or in this case, “animal spirits”), such as its ability to move at incredible speeds, 
all detailed in the Principles. We must further understand that this tiny matter running 
                                                   
188 CSMK, 287; AT IV, 411. 
189 See for example arguments in Montaigne’s Apology for Raymond Sebond, pg. 122, or 
Charron’s De la Sagesse, pg. 104. These are fairly standard skeptical arguments that, 
given the incredibly tight connection between body and soul that Descartes requires, 
need to be dealt with eventually. 
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through our nerves and filtered through the blood is infinitely divisible, which allows for 
its motion in a closed system. All this in turn needs to be understood in terms of the 
plenum, and removed from phony explanations, such as fear of a vacuum. To put it 
bluntly, the body is nothing but mechanics and Descartes’ physics is mechanical. This 
mechanical knowledge should, under my interpretation, help you understand how to 
redirect the physical bits of matter coursing through your system to keep your mind 
maximally free. Thus, there must be an empirical side to ethical study, and this 
empirical side will necessarily relate back to Descartes’ physics. All of physics, 
mechanics, and medicine are central to understanding the way the body works and the 
power that the body can hold over the soul. 
VIII. Conclusion 
 It is clear that Descartes is situated in a wildly diverse context when undertaking 
a treatise on the passions, which includes the medical, ethical, as well as therapeutic. On 
the medical side, Fernel being the exemplar here, Descartes seems quite at home when 
discussing the causes of the passions. Yet when considering the possible cures of the 
passions, his main solution is not any type of medication but mental fortitude, which in 
turn has physical consequences. Equally, the passions contain information that is useful 
to the maintenance of the mind body union. While this does bring Descartes that much 
more in line with the medical tradition, it is equally important to point out that arguing 
for the utility of the passions, draws a non-negligible distinction between traditional 
conceptions of stoic ethics. Returning to Vives, we can find great affinities with 
Descartes’ own account—most notably that the passions are instilled in us to seek out 
good and avoid evil. Yet, Descartes remedy again sets him apart, insofar as it allows for 
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the malleability of the passions to our will and the possibility of reassigning mental 
representations of passions to different physical manifestations of them. 
 The initial divide we noted early on, between the purely mental characteristics of 
the morality discussion in the Discourse and correspondence, is solved through the 
blending of these traditions while maintaining his desire to have both empirical and 
metaphysical pursuits of knowledge. Thus, the more explicitly moral musings through 
the correspondence should be seen merely as the first half of what a more perfect moral 
system would look like. We might even consider the provisional moral code as what an 
ethic might look like if we were not conjoined with a body. But because we are joined 
with a body, there needs to be some treatise like the Passions to gives us a guide for 
controlling the body using our will. This is not to say that the Passions are anything 
close to a perfect moral system, but instead yet another building block toward it. The 
Passions thus serves as the intermediary branch that just begins to connect the 
uppermost branch of Descartes’ tree of philosophy, the perfect moral system, to the 
trunk and roots. Given this interpretation we can both understand how he is able to 
claim to be writing the Passions qua physicist, while at the same time defending its place 
in his moral corpus. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE EXPERIMENTAL PHYSICS OF JACQUES ROHAULT 
I. Introduction to Rohault 
Jacques Rohault (1618-1672) was, if nothing else, a diligent champion of 
Cartesian thought. In 1664, Rohault took as his second wife, Geneviève Clerselier,190 
daughter of Claude Clerselier, editor and zealous propagandist of Descartes works,191 
and thus sealed both his patronage and link to Cartesianism. As has been well 
documented, Rohault was an avid experimenter,192 holding weekly Wednesday 
conferences from 1659 until his death in 1672, where experimental results were 
demonstrated and discussed.193 The emphasis on experiments practiced by Rohault was 
thoroughgoing; flipping to almost any page of his multi-volume Traité de physique, first 
published in 1671, one will almost certainly find some experiment or another described 
in great detail. This, of course, seemed to be quite on par with the burgeoning salon 
culture of the second half of the 17th century in France, and the development of 
experimental societies in England as well.194 However, this emphasis on 
                                                   
190 The most extensive biographical work on Rohault remains Clair’s excellent Bio-
Bibliography (1978). 
191 See McClaughlin (1979) for a description of the great lengths that Clerselier went to 
disseminate Cartesian philosophy. 
192 See McClaughlin (1979, 1996, 2003), Dobre (2013), Roux (2013b), Clair (1978), 
Thorndike (1934, p. 679), and Mouy (1934). 
193 McClaughlin (2003) p. 331. 
194 Roux (2013b) and McClaughlin (1996) are particularly helpful on this point. 
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experimentalism, I will claim, came with a certain lack of attention to other areas of the 
Cartesian corpus, as an obvious lack of metaphysical musings is hard to miss in the 
Traité. This is not to say that experimentation and Cartesianism are in any way opposed 
to each other—on the contrary, as we have seen in previous chapters, there are a great 
number of instances where Descartes himself urges the need for experimentation when 
investigating nature.195 Along these lines, many commentators on Rohault take him to 
be a rank and file member of the Cartesian sect despite the omission of metaphysical 
details.196 To be sure, there are a number of avenues available to explain Rohault’s lack 
of metaphysical interest without being forced to concede that he is attempting anything 
novel. In what follows, I will first set the stage for my thesis by presenting some of the 
standard interpretations of Rohault’s Traité, and discussing what ways have been used 
to explain the absence of a metaphysical analogue to Descartes’ Meditations. Next, I will 
present a case study in Rohault’s experimental philosophy with the example of his 
extensive experimentation on the void. This will be contrasted with Descartes’ own 
discussions of the void and some of his thoughts on the relation of metaphysics to 
experimentation, using some of the discussion from the previous chapters. With this all 
in place, I will demonstrate how Rohault’s methods, not his conclusions, mark him out 
as carving out a unique niche for himself that has been unappreciated by scholars up to 
this point. In short, I will show that while Descartes’ own take on experiments depends 
crucially on having a well sorted metaphysics, Rohault’s system is designed to remove 
                                                   
195 Most notable are the remarks he makes in the Discourse on Method (AT VI, 22, 29, 
63-65, 94).  
196 Des Chene (2002) p. 184, for example, portrays Rohault as the opposite of an 
innovator, looking only to fill out Descartes system. McClaughlin, as well, claims him as 
a “meticulous Cartesian,” following Descartes to the last detail (1979) p. 570. 
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the need for metaphysics all together, which has broad consequences visible in his 
method. 
II. Possible Explanations of Rohault’s Missing Metaphysics 
It was commonplace in treatises on Cartesian natural philosophy, among the 
most well-known 17th century Cartesians, to briefly survey Cartesian epistemology and 
metaphysics, running first through doubt, and then to the first bits of knowledge—God, 
the self, etc. For example, in Antoine le Grand’s An Entire Body of Philosophy, chapter 
II very briefly runs through the proof of God’s existence, via our innate idea of him, and 
the cogito. Along with this, clear and distinct ideas are established the hallmark of truth 
and knowledge. Similarly, in Pierre-Sylvain Régis’197 Cours entier de philosophie, the 
first book runs through a brief history of philosophy, culminating with, of course, 
Descartes. Régis passes briefly through Descartes’ Discourse on Method, and his 
Meditations, before continuing on to the bulk of his treatise, explaining the nature of 
man qua body, qua mind, and qua mind-body union.198 Needless to say, the repetition of 
Descartes’ basic metaphysics and epistemology seemed almost a formulaic necessity 
among the early Cartesians, especially in the textbook tradition.199 Rohault, whose 
Traité was published before Le Grand and Régis’ books, defined a different path. To 
                                                   
197 Régis was one of Rohault’s most famous students. 
198 Régis was very engaged in defending Cartesian metaphysics. In 1691 he published a 
detailed response to the slew of objections from Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Censura. See 
Thomas Lennon’s introduction to his translation of Huet’s Censura for a more detailed 
account of Huet’s anti-Cartesianism. See also chapters 1 and 2 in Lennon (2008). 
199 This is not to say, however, that their repetitions of Descartes’ metaphysics were 
completely orthodox. A great many differences and disagreements can be found in the 
majority of the early Cartesians. However, the fact that there is an inclusion of 
metaphysics at all, following good Cartesian order, is sufficient for my thesis forwarded 
here. It is also important to note that these books have different purposes. For example, 
Régis’ Cours entier was meant to be a complete textbook for Cartesian philosophy, while 
Rohault’s Traité was only meant to cover physics. 
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begin, Rohault, unlike the philosophers mentioned above, never attempted a complete 
curriculum in Cartesian philosophy, and beyond any form of robust physics, there is no 
mention of ethics either. Indeed, there is little doubt that Rohault’s treatise was 
designed to be solely a treatise on physics, with no promise of future expansion into a 
complete curriculum. Even so, given the tight relationship between physics, 
metaphysics, and experimentation that Descartes’ own system of natural philosophy 
entails, it is unusual for any follower of Descartes to attempt a discussion of physics 
without the necessary toolbox provided by Cartesian metaphysics.200 
Trevor McClaughlin has conjectured that this notable absence of metaphysics 
might be explicable through a closer examination of the historical context surrounding 
Cartesianism in the 17th century. McClaughlin points out that less than ten years after 
Descartes’ death a long series of censures, condemnations, and warnings were issued to 
those practicing Cartesianism, which resulted in a very explicit fear among the early 
adopters.201 McClaughlin’s claim is that Rohault, reacting directly to fear of these 
condemnations, shied away from making bold metaphysical claims that could easily be 
misinterpreted and lead to trouble, instead retreating back toward the relatively 
uncontroversial realm of experimental natural philosophy.202 While McClaughlin never 
goes so far as to say that this was Rohault’s only motivation, we should certainly play 
close attention to the significant evidence that it was a consideration weighing heavily 
on his mind and influencing his publishing decisions. Indeed, Rohault even took some 
                                                   
200 Of course there is the notable exception of Regius, whose Fundamenta Physices was 
equally scant on metaphysics. See Verbeek (1994). 
201 McClaughlin (1979), 578. The main thrust of these condemnations seems to have 
been centered on Descartes account of the Eucharist, among some of his other 
metaphysical claims.  
202 See McClaughlin (1979) and, to a lesser extent, (2003). 
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precautions in having his peers to adopt different strategies to avoid any unwanted 
attention. In a letter to Nicolas Poisson from the 4th of July 1671, Rohault expresses 
some concern over the bold position Poisson has taken regarding animal souls in his 
Commentaire ou remarques sur la méthod de René Descartes. 
One must be attentive to the enmity and malignancy of those people who must 
not be irritated. If you could believe me, I would counsel you to take care in the 
choice of things you treat, and if I were in your place, I would abstain from 
touching those topics that are the furthest from people’s preoccupations. I would 
imagine that it suffices to teach the first elements of the philosophy of Mr. 
Descartes, as I have attempted to do, and for the rest, those who will be the 
slightest initiated, will fall in of themselves. 203 
This brief comment goes a long way to showcase Rohault’s prudence. While it is 
impossible to deny the influence of political considerations in Rohault’s work, in what 
follows, I wish to highlight that Rohault’s exclusion of metaphysics cuts much deeper 
into his philosophy than simple prudence would suggest. Specifically, it will become 
clear that Rohault’s method, and his manner of exposition goes starkly against the 
Cartesian project and shows that not only did Rohault not want to include Descartes’ 
metaphysics but had disagreements that were in stark opposition to it. 
III. A Brief Note on Rohault’s Rhetoric 
 At a superficial level, Rohault’s rhetorical strategy, like that of many of his 
Cartesian contemporaries, was designed to distance himself from the novelty and 
controversial nature of Descartes’ natural philosophy. For example, Rohault repeats the 
well-worn declaration that his own work in no way disagrees with the Aristotelean 
                                                   
203 Clair (1978) p. 168. 
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philosophy and contains nothing truly novel in it. Of course, paying lip service to the 
philosophers was in no way shocking, even Descartes consistently wrote that his own 
philosophy presented nothing new and Aristotle would agree with it. However, Rohault 
goes one step further than Descartes in his Entretiens sur la philosophie and highlights 
exactly what he takes to be the benefits of his work, or how it compliments Aristotle.  
 If one wants to show that [Aristotle] was wrong, it will only be in certain places, 
where even the Aristotelians abandon him, and more so in some other places 
regarding things that have only recently been discovered through the invention of 
the telescope, microscope, and through certain recent experiments that this 
ancient philosopher was not aware of.204 
Thus, much of the advantage to be gained from a new philosophy is brought about 
through expanding knowledge through a more modern experimental method and recent 
developments in scientific instruments.205 Yet, as one would expect in a Cartesian text, 
the praise of Aristotle’s work is usually followed by some veiled slight; at one point, 
Rohault claims that Aristotle represents just the first step, where the more specific and 
“loftier” knowledge will come from his successors—assigning knowledge gained from 
experimental methods a “loftier” status is something Descartes never came close to 
endorsing. This belittling of speculative philosophy (i.e. one that produces no practical 
results) is abundant throughout Rohault’s works, while the art and practice of the 
craftsman is lauded.206 This emphasis on practical results above all else is a consistent 
theme throughout Rohault’s works, and the main cause to search for a new philosophy. 
                                                   
204 Rohault (1671) p. 105-106. 
205 Comments like these also appear in Rohault’s System (Preface, non-paginated). 
206 This sentiment is also expressed by M.N., Rohault’s interlocutor in his Entretiens 
(Rohault (1671) p. 109-110). 
94 
 
Descartes, in contrast, famously noted the constant flux and diversity of opinions in 
philosophy so as to showcase the stability and consistency of his paradigm of 
knowledge, mathematics. Rhetorically, it is quite telling that Rohault adopts the results 
of artisans to show that the ancient philosophy is deficient; and even though Descartes’ 
preferred example, mathematics, is acknowledged by Rohault as constantly improving 
over the years based on reason, the artisans, as he also notes, improved, but without 
requiring the same theoretical foundations.207  
IV. Descartes and the Void 
 Moving past Rohault’s rhetorical style, into the depth of Rohault’s divergence 
from Descartes, I would like to first to look at Descartes’ treatment of the possibility of a 
vacuum or void, and then reflect upon Rohault’s own discussion of the matter. We can 
see the first discussion of the void, although it is quite brief, in the Regulae, where 
Descartes roundly rejects the possibility, and gives an early version of an argumentative 
strategy that will be consistently used throughout his works.208  
If, say, we conclude that a given space full of air is empty, on the grounds that we 
do not perceive anything in it, either by sight, touch, or any other sense, then we 
are incorrectly conjoining the nature of a vacuum with the nature of this space. 
This is just what happens when we judge that we can deduce something general 
and necessary from something particular and contingent.209 
This basic argument is later developed to explain how we come to have a word ‘empty’ if 
the world is completely full, or a plenum.  
                                                   
207 See the preface to Rohault’s System. 
208 However, Descartes is not quite so direct in The World—I imagine this is due to the 
rhetorical strategy he adopted in that work. 
209 AT X, 424; CSM I, 48. 
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In its ordinary use the term ‘empty’ usually refers not to a place or space in which 
there is absolutely nothing at all, but simply to a place in which there is none of 
the things that we think ought be there. Thus a pitcher made to hold water is 
called ‘empty’ when it is simply full of air.210 
In short, whenever we use the term ‘empty’ we merely mean full of something else, 
otherwise the word will have no meaning at all. 
Of course, none of this is a very strong argument against the possibility of the 
void—at best this claims that any concept of the void is not based on actual sense 
experience, but this does not represent the sum total of Descartes’ arsenal against the 
void. Throughout his works, Descartes gives a total of three distinct arguments against 
the void’s possibility. The first is one claims that the simple concept of a void contains 
an internal contradiction: “nothing can have no properties.”211 This is expressed most 
strongly to Mersenne when Descartes asserts that it is just as impossible for there to be a 
void in nature as it is for a mountain to exist without a corresponding valley.212 
Descartes’ second argument is from the inconceivability of anything like a truly empty 
space. Simply put, it is impossible for us to conceive of a void; therefore, one must not 
exist.213 The third and most sophisticated argument, which is very closely related to the 
previous two, is that our concept of substance and space are, in fact, identical; thus, by 
                                                   
210 AT IXb, 72; CSM I, 230. This style of argument also occurs in the sixth meditation. 
211 This basic line is repeated often. See a letter from 29 July 1648 for Arnauld (AT V, 
223); CSMK 356; August 1649 to More (AT V, 403; CSMK, 381); and in the Principles 
(AT IXb, 72); CSM I, 230. 
212 15 November 1638 (AT II, 440; CSMK, 131). 
213 See again the letter for Arnauld (AT V, 224; CSMK, 359); also, 6 June 1647 to Chanut 
(AT V, 52;CSMK, 320). 
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definition, any space must be completely full of matter.214 This collapse of substance and 
place happens quite abruptly in part II of the Principles. 
When we say that a thing is in a given place, all we mean is that it occupies such 
and such a position relative to other things; but when we go on to say that it fills 
up a given space or place, we mean in addition that it has precisely the size and 
shape of the space in question.215 
Slightly further on Descartes goes on to clarify this point. 
For a body’s being extended in length, breadth, and depth in itself warrants the 
conclusion that it is a substance, since it is a complete contradiction that a 
particular extension should belong to nothing.216 
It is important to note here that all three arguments are a priori, which is to say, despite 
Descartes’ frequent use of analogy, experience, and experiment to justify his claims in 
the Principles, his objection to the existence of the void rests solely in the intellect. This 
is evidently why, when pressed on this issue by More, Descartes is forced to admit that if 
God were to annihilate all the matter contained in a vessel, the sides must necessarily 
come together.217 Even in the face of divine omnipotence, Descartes simply will not 
budge on this issue.218 
 Interestingly, Descartes is not always quite so abrupt when addressing questions 
of the void. As one of my central claims will be that Rohault and Descartes begin to 
                                                   
214 Woolhouse (1994) calls this a “thick” conception of space. 
215 AT IXb, 70; CSM I, 229. 
216 AT IXb, 72; CSM I, 230. 
217 AT V, 272; CSMK, 363. 
218 This is especially interesting given Descartes’ position on the eternal truths. In short, 
in an exchange with Mesland, Descartes explains that God’s absolute power is 
unbounded, and he could even do things that seem contradictory, such as creating 
creatures that are not dependent on him for their existence (AT IV, 119; CSMK, 235).  
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come apart on questions like the coherence of the void—where Descartes considers it to 
be nothing more than common language misfiring in philosophical discourse—it is 
worthwhile to quickly address the cases where Descartes seems quite willing to adopt 
the terminology of the void to make a point. In an early letter dated sometime between 
October and November 1631 Descartes writes to Mersenne, "I am not going back on 
what I said concerning the speed of weights falling in a vacuum. For if we suppose a 
vacuum, as everyone imagines that there is, the rest follows demonstratively.”219 
Similarly, in a letter dated 13 November 1639 Descartes writes again to Mersenne, “You 
were quite correct to hold that in the void itself, if it be possible, a stone will go slower or 
faster, insofar as it was moved slowly or quickly.”220 To come to terms with how 
Descartes might have been using the term “void” here, it might be useful to jump slightly 
forward to the Principles, where he asks us to consider several scenarios involving 
“empty space.”221 By “empty space” Descartes means a space that is “full of a matter that 
does not contribute anything to the movement of other bodies, and does not impede it 
either.”222 Descartes goes on to explain how this type of empty space would affect matter 
moving away from a rotating body. He claims that if we were to suppose this type of 
empty space along the path of matter moving away from the rotating body, in this case 
the sun, matter closer to the rotating body would move to “fill up that space.”223 
                                                   
219 AT I, 228; CSMK, 33. 
220 AT II, 618.  
221 Of course, I am not trying to claim that the use of “empty” space found in the 
Principles is the same use of “void” in his early correspondence; instead I merely want 
to claim that the Principles highlight an epistemological avenue that was never ruled 
out, and at time explicitly endorsed, in Descartes’ philosophy. 
222 AT IXb, 133. 
223 “[S]i le lieu marqué F estoit vuide, toute celle qui sont en l’espace BFD, 
s’avanceroient autant qu’il se pourroit afin de le remplir, et non point les autres” (AT 
IXb, 134-135). 
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However, the matter on the side of the empty space furthest from the rotating body 
would not advance to fill this empty space at all, due to the fact that it has no matter 
pushing it in that direction. Presumably, if the rotating body stopped rotating, thus 
causing the surrounding matter to also cease its motion, the empty space would not be 
filled. In effect, Descartes is claiming that even if there were to be something quite 
similar to a void, matter would be indifferent to it; in short, and in not terribly catchy 
terms, nature does not abhor a space filled with matter that contributes nothing to 
motion.  
In yet another case of “empty space,” Descartes attempts to clear up his notion of 
gravitation through considering what would happen if the Earth were surrounded by 
“empty space,” in his technical sense of the word. The thought is that without the 
surrounding matter, that is to say, matter that provides resistance, we would not be held 
down and would therefore fly away from the rotating Earth; just as a ball “strives” away 
from a rotating sling and flies away in a straight line once the leather strap no longer 
holds the shot in place. Again, nothing here is very mysterious; Descartes is doing 
nothing more than creating what we might call today an idealized scenario.224 
 In both the early correspondence and in the Principles one thing seems 
abundantly clear—when Descartes uses the term ‘void’ or ‘empty space’, this is nothing 
more than coded language for an idealized scenario where certain variables are simply 
ignored.225 This can be done by either omitting the properties of matter, or simply giving 
it properties sufficient to counteract its normal effects. The latter strategy is adopted in 
his correspondence with Mersenne when he defines a non-resistant medium as where 
                                                   
224 See Zepeda (2013) for a lengthier defense of this point. 
225 See Palmer (1999). 
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“all the parts of the surrounding liquid body are disposed to move at the same speed as 
the original body in such a way as to leave room for it and take up its room.”226 
Descartes, it seems, can consistently hold that the terms ‘void’ and ‘empty space’ are 
incoherent, while, at the same time making use of them—so long as the meaning is 
sufficiently well subverted. It is equally clear that there is no reference to experience or 
experiment, nor does there seem to be any place for such reference at all in establishing 
the possibility or impossibility of a void in nature.227  
The position that any experimentation on the void is a simple category mistake 
comes out quite clearly in Descartes’ correspondence. In letter to Mersenne, he is 
insistent that experimentally testing for a vacuum will be fruitless. 
I do not know, given that your researchers of the void want to do their 
experiment in a chamber where it is so well sealed that the outside air would have 
no contact there. This is what they will not easily accomplish. But, if they do 
accomplish it, I assure you that the mercury will not in any way fall from the 
hose; not because it is lighter, nor that the column of air resists it more, but 
because there is no place in the chamber where it can move to, because it will be 
totally full of air.228 
                                                   
226 AT II, 482-483; CSMK, 132. Joseph Zepeda rightly points to this passage being 
noticeably absent in Eric Palmer’s essay “Descartes on Nothing in Particular.” This 
section, as Zepeda argues, nicely undercuts Palmer’s reading of Descartes as allowing a 
coherent concept of a genuine vacuum (Zepeda (2013) p. 130). 
227 There are many instances where Descartes does think experience is required. A few 
examples are magnets, air resistance, fetal development, and a great many more. 
228 31 January 1648 (AT V, 116). 
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This insistence on reinterpreting any possible experimental results to conform to his 
theory persists during Pascal’s famed Puy-de-Dôme experiment.229 Certainly, many 
have taken this experiment to show that there was such a thing as a vacuum, but 
Descartes, unsurprisingly, interpreted it quite differently. When later told of the results 
of the experiment by Carcavi, Descartes claims that he assured Pascal it would succeed 
because it conformed to his principles.230 Given his firmness on this issue, even in the 
face of elaborate experimental date, I would like to highlight two points. First, Descartes 
could never have envisioned the Puy-de-Dôme experiment as designed to test for the 
possible existence of a vacuum;231 this kind of hypothesis was already ruled out before 
the experiment had even begun. Secondly, Descartes’ metaphysics, established in parts I 
and II of the Principles, are used here as an interpretive lens for experimental data, and 
is epistemologically prior to it.232 
V. Rohault on Metaphysics and the Void 
 All this should be of no surprise; Descartes’ instance on correct order in 
approaching natural philosophy is in no need of further commentary. Rohault’s 
treatment of this issue, however, allows for some further remarks. In the preface to his 
System, Rohault quickly distinguishes his method from that of Descartes. While 
                                                   
229 During Puy-de-Dôme experiment a tube filled with mercury, sealed at one end and 
submerged in a vat of mercury at the other, was carried up the mountain to determine 
what would happen to the level of mercury. As the apparatus was raised up the 
mountain the level of mercury fell, leaving an empty spot at the top of the tube where 
the mercury once was. Pascal would go on to interpret this experiment as showing that 
nature did not abhor a vacuum, as they could easily occur, and that the drop in fluid 
level was resulting from the column of air above the apparatus being reduced as they 
ascended the mountain. 
230 17 August 1649, AT V, 391. 
231 Descartes claimed to have been the one who suggest the experiment to Pascal. See 
Descartes to Mersenne, 13 December 1647 (AT V, 99), and to Carcavi, 11 June 1649 (AT 
V, 365) 
232 See Chapter II. 
101 
 
Descartes, in many instances, used reason to move from the visible world to the invisible 
one (i.e. the world of infinitely divisible matter, tiny pores, and various shaped 
particles), Rohault intentionally only addresses what is necessary for practical results 
and shows little interest in theorizing beyond what is readily of use. 
 For instance, what good do those long and nice disputes do about the divisibility 
of matter? For though it could not be accurately determined whether it be 
infinitely divisible or no; it would be sufficient to know that it can be divided into 
parts small enough to serve for all purposes that can be.233 
It is important to note that the infinite divisibility of matter is not only something that 
Descartes believes is known clear and distinctly, but he claims it is absolutely necessary 
for the proper functioning of his principles in nature.234 The fact that Rohault abstains 
from establishing the infinite divisibility of matter is, at its very core, already a major 
break from Cartesian method and physics. In other words, we see yet again that 
Rohault’s only concern is the results and not the truth of theory that those very results 
are a function of.  
Rohault believes that these types of philosophical arguments that result in no 
practical applications were part of the reason why the ancient philosophers did not 
succeed. Beyond quibbling over unimportant problems, Rohault alleges, the ancients 
erred insofar as they did not take sufficient account of experimentation, a problem 
resulting from an over emphasis on metaphysics and abstraction.235 Certainly though, 
among his lambasting of pure speculative philosophy, Rohault does allow for reason to 
play some role in his system, although its exact function is less than clear. At one point 
                                                   
233 Rohault (1723) Preface, non-paginated.  
234 AT VIII, 60; CSM 239. 
235 Rohault (1723) Preface, non-paginated. 
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in the System, Rohault motions toward reason giving us freedom to draw conclusions, 
but his only clarification of this point is that philosophers who overly privilege 
experiment, “hinder the knowledge of a large train of truths, which may many times be 
deduced from one single experiment.”236 So, here at least, the role of reason again seems 
only secondary to experiments, insofar as we reason from after an experiment, not 
before, as Descartes had insisted upon.237 
 Further dismissing Descartes’ manner of philosophizing, Rohault rejects 
hyperbolic doubt, as it is a “very difficult task,” and also where “there are a great many 
truths, which ought by no means be rejected.”238 This, fairly directly, highlights 
Rohault’s distrust of the most basic tenet of Descartes’ epistemology—and while this 
might again be a sign of his prudence regarding the fear of censure his claims that doubt 
can hinder the quest for knowledge might stretch this interpretation too far.239 However, 
despite rejecting the method of doubt, Rohault does accept the solidity of the cogito and 
that God exists, but offers no argument for this, explicitly leaving it as a task appropriate 
only to the theologians.240 All this evasion of metaphysics, with the rhetoric surrounding 
it, would fit nicely in McClaughlin’s thesis that Rohault avoided metaphysics out of fear 
of censure. Indeed, hyperbolic doubt, and Descartes’ arguments for God’s existence 
where among his most incendiary claims, worthy of caution. Criticisms of these points 
were frequent, and possibly quite dangerous for the author.241 However, Rohault’s 
dissent from Cartesian method, as I shall argue, is not simply one of omitted words, but 
                                                   
236 Rohault (1723) Preface, non-paginated. 
237 Cf. Roux (2013b). 
238 Rohault (1723) vol. 1, p. 2. 
239 Rouhault (1723) vol. 1, p. 2. 
240 Rohault (1723) vol. 1, p. 5. 
241 See Verbeek’s Descartes and the Dutch, for an incredibly insightful look at the 
various troubles Descartes’ philosophy brought down on him. 
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how he actually proceeds with his positive project of natural philosophy is difficult, if 
not impossible, to marry with his status as a scrupulous follower of Descartes as many 
commentators would contend. 
 As a case study in Rohault’s method of philosophy, we can turn back to our 
previous discussion of Descartes and the void to see just how Rohault dealt with the 
same topic. To be sure, the void was one topic where Rohault showed a great deal of 
interest, and caused a great deal of his fame. At his death in 1672, Rohault still 
possessed several instruments for performing experiments regarding the void; of which, 
one was a copper syringe, and the other was a box of glass tubes all specifically designed 
for experimentation on the void.242 Rohault was equally fascinated with Pascal’s Puy-de-
Dôme experiment, even recreating it, although he was forced to scale down the 
experiment by climbing a church tower instead of a mountain and then descending to 
the surface of the frozen Seine to be able to accomplish the feat in Paris.243 All this 
seems to be part and parcel of a more general vacuum-mania sweeping both England 
and France during the 17th and early 18th centuries.244 However, whereas Descartes is 
dismissive at best of experimentation settling the status of the void, Rohault has no 
problem moving the question into the experimental realm. 
 Despite having “nothing has no properties” listed as one of his axioms,245 Rohault 
designs several experiments to test for just this fact. For example, when the mercury of a 
                                                   
242 See McClaughlin (1976) 14-17. There were a great many more instruments and 
experiments described in chapter 12 of the System.  
243 Rohault, 72. Dobre (2013) p. 213-218 also has a nice discussion of Rohault’s work on 
the void. 
244 For more history on experimentation on the vacuum in Royal Society and the 
Académie Royale des Sciences, see Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air Pump, 
as well as Edward Grant’s aptly titled book, Much ado about Nothing. 
245 Rohault (1723) vol. 1, p. 18. 
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tube sealed at one end and submerged in mercury at the other descends slightly, the 
visibly empty space at the top posed quite a problem for those who denied the possibility 
of a void. The predictable Cartesian response is simple: there is no such thing as void, as 
if there were the sides would be touching, therefore, there must be some matter in the 
tube that entered through some pores. Rohault goes further than this, and concludes 
from light passing through the empty portion of the tube, there must be some matter 
filling the uppermost space. He also holds a flame to the empty part, and observes the 
mercury dropping, due, as he believes, to the rarefaction of the finer parts of matter still 
contained in the tube itself.246 Rohault is all too ready to address his opponents on 
experimental terms regarding this very fundamental question to Cartesian physics, even 
creating a device designed to simulate a vacuum inside a vacuum, later dubbed the 
chambre de Rohault. These types of experiments were also a major part of his famous 
Wednesday lectures.247 In an unpublished set of notes on Rohault’s Wednesday 
meetings, the author notes the evidence gathered from Torricelli’ experiments on 
problems with pumps only being effective to a certain depth.248 In short, experimenters 
found that a hand driven water pump would only be effective up to around 32 feet in 
depth, and beyond that it was concluded that anything remaining in the pump was void. 
Instead of arguing the results of the experiment, as one might expect, Rohault in turn 
                                                   
246 Rohault (1723) p. 64-65. One of the great benefits of using the Clarke edition of 
Rohault’s System is his perceptive and biting criticisms inserted as footnotes. In this 
case Clarke is quick to note that there is no need to conclude from light shining through 
necessitates some form of matter being in that space. There is, as Clarke points out, 
equally good reason to believe that light would not be able to pass through a completely 
full space. Regarding the rarefaction of the empty space, Clarke is willing to conclude 
that small amounts of air very well could have entered into that space and are the cause 
of the rarefaction, and therefore, the slight fall in the level of mercury. 
247 Roux (2013b), McClaughlin (1996). 
248 Not much is known about these notes, but they are listed as being collected by a M. F. 
avocat. Rohault (1660) p. 12v. 
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offers his own experiment involving one of his syringes. He follows this up by recounting 
Pascal’s barrel experiment in Rouen, then another experiment involving small vials of 
mercury, and yet another experiment performed at the top of the Tour Saint-Jacques by 
Rohault himself. All of this, Rohault concludes, clearly demonstrates that all 
experimental evidence points toward the weight of air causing the phenomena and not 
any void or fear of one. Opening up a question such as this to the experimental method, 
which should be settled only through reason according to Descartes, must be seen as a 
sharp rebuke to the Cartesian doctrine of clear and distinct perceptions, and the 
metaphysics associated with it. If Rohault is willing to reconsider and test even clear and 
distinct perceptions, which for Descartes are the paradigm of certainty, he must 
certainly be considered something less than a “meticulous” follower of Descartes. 
VI. Conclusion: A Worthless Metaphysics 
 It might be objected, however, that Rohault’s experimental confirmation of the 
plenum is merely aimed at rebutting popular views being propagated during his day. 
After all, it is true that many of Rohault’s vacuum experiments end with a conclusion 
regarding properties of the column of air and its weight, but I believe this would be 
forcing Rohault to fit into a Cartesian shaped cookie cutter where he simply does not fit 
and ignoring the unique path that Rohault had laid out before himself. To be sure, there 
are many experiments that are specifically designed for testing properties of the column 
of air—for example, the chambre de Rohault cannot be understood as testing anything 
else. However, there are also series of experiment that cannot be made sense of without 
assuming the are designed to directly test the possibility of the void. For example, in 
Rohault’s chapter in his System titled, “Of such Motions as are commonly ascribed to 
the Fear of a Vacuum” he demonstrates that light shines through the empty area at the 
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top of an inverted mercury tube. Just after this he notes that applying heat from a fire to 
this empty space causes the mercury to descend, showing that whatever is at the top of 
the tube is able to be rarified.249 Both of these simple experiments cannot be seen as 
trying to discover anything about the column of the air, nor can they be interpreted as 
trying to deduce properties of subtle matter. The fact that subtle mater conducted heat, 
could be rarified, or transmitted light, was never in question for the Cartesians—even if 
it were, there would be no need of such an elaborate experiment. My claim, however, is 
not just that in this one instance, Rohault believes himself able to experiment on a basic 
principle of Cartesian physics, but it is emblematic of a broader trend in his method of 
natural philosophy.  
If we look some of other examples from Rohault’s System, where he treats topics 
under the scope of clear and distinct perception, he consistently shies away from 
Descartes’ own arguments, to the point of completely ignoring them. Rohault is simply 
uninterested in the type of certainty that Descartes’ metaphysics is designed to confer. 
When discussing the existence of external objects, Rohault admits the force of doubt and 
relegates himself to speaking of a mere possible existence. Rohault’s position on 
refraction is equally telling, and offers a sharp rebuke to the faith Descartes had placed 
in the force of reason concerning his explanation of refraction. After rehearsing 
Descartes’ argument from the Dioptrics, Rohault comes to an apparent contradiction, 
the argument entails, “that the ball [used in the thought experiment] ought to be in two 
different places at the same time.” In response to this problem, Rohault is all but 
completely dismissive of the force of reason. 
                                                   
249 Rohault (1723) p. 64-65. 
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 But let us not imagine that there is any fault in the form of this argument which 
seems to conclude in an impossibility; let us rather say, that it be conclusive, it is 
a certain sign, that the fault was in some of the suppositions that were made. And 
so indeed it was, for we suppose that the ball, when it had lost half of its motion 
by meeting the superficies of the water, would enter into it, though it fell never so 
oblique, which is not so. For we see by experience in a Sea-Fight that cannonballs 
which are shot too oblique upon the water are reflected by the superficies of the 
sea.250 
Experience then, in this case of sea battles, is the ultimate arbiter and corrects our well-
reasoned argument. The charge then is that Descartes never adjusted his results to cater 
to experience, and thus falls into the same pitfall Rohault initially accused the ancients 
of. Whether or not this charge is justly leveled against Descartes, there are instances 
when reason alone is sufficient, and for Descartes, refraction has all the signs of being 
one of these cases.251  
 To be sure, there might be many motivating factors pushing Rohault away from 
the broader metaphysical physics of Descartes, but the few instances where Rohault 
broaches questions considered to be under the purview of reason alone, he is not at all 
afraid to question, test, and reconsider them. While this is the mark of a good scientist, 
it is sadly not always the mark of a good Cartesian and should be recognized as a major 
departure for Descartes’ faith in the force and truth of clear and distinct perceptions. To 
paint a broader picture, it does seem that Rohault is in agreement with Descartes on a 
                                                   
250 Rohault (1723) vol. I, p. 96. 
251 “I laugh at Mr. Petit and his arguments, and, it seems to me, we don’t have any more 
cause to listen to him, as he promises to refute my refractions through experience as if 
he wanted to show that the three angles of a triangle did not add up to two right angles 
by using a poorly made T-square” (to Mersenne, 9 February 1639, AT II, 497). 
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great many things necessary for his physics (i.e. the world being a plenum, the existence 
of subtle matter and tiny pores, etc.), but without the metaphysics guiding his 
interpretations of experimentation, as we have seen, we have an interesting instance of a 
Cartesian in subject matter, yet not in method. With this in mind, we can come to a 
more crisp image of the separation between Rohault and Descartes. To borrow some 
terminology from Peter Anstey and Alberto Vanzo, there is a difference between an 
experimenter and an experimental philosopher.252 An experimenter, on the one hand, is 
someone that critiques, and engages in experimentation. An experimental philosopher, 
on the other hand, is one that uses experimentation as the primary means of acquiring 
knowledge. Anstey and Vanzo classify Descartes as merely an experimenter, but I think 
this categorization is a bit too hasty. As we saw earlier in chapter II, Descartes is indeed 
an experimenter in regards to a great many questions. He actively critiques various 
experiments, but in no way acknowledge their validity regarding questions such as the 
possibility of void. On the other hand, contrary to Anstey and Vanzo, there are other 
areas where experimental data appears to be absolutely foundational for Descartes’ 
conclusions (i.e. his theory of the rainbow or determining the speed of light). On the 
other hand, it is much easier to classify Rohault as an experimental philosopher and 
difficult to find places where he would be considered a simple experimenter. For 
Rohault, there appears nothing that is off the table for facing empirical testing. If all this 
is correct, we should conclude that the differences between Rohault and Descartes are 
more substantial than has previously been recognized. Lastly, by rooting Rohault more 
firmly in the experimental philosopher category we can begin to understand more 
clearly his recalcitrance to admit several of the central “discoveries” of Descartes based 
                                                   
252 Anstey and Vanzo (2016). 
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on clear and distinct perception. Seeing Rohault in this light gives us a better 
understand of the type of experimentation he was performing—one that was not 
universally filtered through metaphysics—and further gives us a clearly contrast to 
understand Descartes’ own experimental method.
110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CLAUDE GADROYS AND CARTESIAN ASTROLOGY 
 
 While Descartes sought to build up knowledge through a methodological 
skepticism, his life seems to have been pervaded by a more practical skepticism for the 
science and medicine of his day. Descartes was openly doubtful of healing springs, 
blood-letting, and a great many other phenomena reported to him through his web of 
correspondents. Keeping his systematic natural philosophy in mind, it is not uncommon 
to hear Descartes portrayed as a banisher of superstition, yet, as I will claim, this this is 
only half the story. To get a better handle on how Descartes influenced superstition and 
the occult, I will be limiting my discussion to his influence on astrology. To be sure, 
Descartes’s impact on the history of astrology paints a very curious picture. Glancing at 
it from one angle shows the portrait of a man very much opposed to astrology and 
astrologers. Yet, if we look at a slightly different angle we see quite a different image; 
one of a man who established a system of philosophy and physics that, however 
unwittingly, provided a decidedly well-lit avenue for grounding the beleaguered science 
of astrology. To fully flesh out this second perspective on Cartesian thought I will be 
taking up the curious case of Claude Gadroys: an early Cartesian astrologist. To this end, 
I will first elaborate on some of the basic elements of Descartes’s physics along with 
some of his explicit claims regarding astrology. Later, I will detail Gadroys’s own theory, 
the theoretical complications it faced in finding a home in Cartesian physics, and the 
solutions to these complications. Lastly, I will try to draw some broader conclusions
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about the relationship between Descartes’s own views on the occult, astrology, and the 
like, and the reception of the new mechanical philosophy. Specifically, I will show, 
through the case of Gadroys, that the reception of Cartesian thought, while often 
depicted in the secondary literature as a precursor to modern scientific thought and 
method, varied widely, and offered as much an avenue for the occult and fringe science 
as for any other philosophy.253 Along these lines we will see how mechanism, as broadly 
understood in the modern period, in no way excluded the possibility of a science of 
astrology, as has been often assumed.  
 To continue, if I may, the imagery of a portrait of 
Descartes, it will be a propos to begin with just that, his 
portrait. We can turn now to the engraving done in 1644 
by one of Descartes’s close acquaintances, Franz Van 
Schooten the Younger.254 Descartes255 himself was 
generally quite pleased with the portrait, although he did 
have several complaints. He first complained that the 
beard and clothing did not at all resemble his own, but, 
more importantly, he objected to the text in the oval border surrounding the portrait. 
Specifically, Descartes did not favor the title given to him in the border, and secondly, he 
wanted his birthdate removed. In Descartes’s own words: 
I ask you to remove these words: Perronij toparcha, natus die ultimo Martij 
1596. The first, because I have any aversion for any type of titles, and the last 
                                                   
253 It seems to be a general assumption among many scholars that the mechanism of the 
modern period led to astrology’s further fall into discredit, see Thagard (1978) for just 
one example of this. 
254 For an excellent discussion of this and other images of Descartes see Nadler (2013). 
 
Figure 1: Descartes 
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because I also have an aversion for the makers of horoscopes, whose error we 
seem to be contributing to when someone’s date of birth is published.256 
Quite happily, because this is the only reason that we know his date of birth, Descartes 
did not get his way. His distrust for astrologers so neatly intimated here is not unique to 
this passage, as his repugnance for their science spills over into several of his 
correspondences, as well as the Discourse on Method, when he quite flatly asserts his 
own lack of credulity, “as for the false sciences, I thought that I already knew their worth 
well enough not to be liable to be deceived by the promises of an alchemist or the 
predictions of an astrologer.”257 
 Despite Descartes’s overt skepticism toward astrology, he did not likewise 
completely deny its efficacy. Quite to the contrary, Descartes believed that the 
prognostications of astrologers did work, albeit not for the reasons purported by the 
astrologers themselves. In a letter to Princess Elisabeth, dated 8 July 1644, Descartes 
highlights the mind’s power over the body in cases of self-fulfilling prophecies brought 
on by negative predictions. “[There are] some people who are convinced by an 
astrologer or doctor that they must die at a certain time, and for this reason alone fall ill, 
and frequently even die.”258 While this might seem a bit out of line with Descartes’s 
mechanical worldview, the claim is not at all out of the ordinary for Descartes’s general 
medical philosophy. Indeed, for Descartes, the mind has significant power to act on the 
body, which can cause the body harm or help it maintain or regain a healthy state—for 
                                                   
256 AT V, 338. 
257 AT VI, 9; CSM I, 115. 
258 AT V, 65-66; CSMK, 237. Far from just an abstraction, Descartes seemed to believe 
that this actually happened to an acquaintance, Hortensius, along with two young 
Italians (AT III, 15).  
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example, Descartes’s advice to a sickly Elisabeth is to simply cheer up.259 These powers 
of the mind over the body and the body’s influences upon the mind are brought out in 
great detail in both Descartes’s Passions of the Soul and L’Homme.260 Thus, Descartes 
has a wide variety of mechanisms already in place to explain the real effects of astrology 
on their believers, yet has no need to reach as far as the stars to explain the influence. 
 From these passages, among others,261 Descartes’s position on astrology is 
abundantly clear: whatever efficacy the stars have on us, it has it through our belief in 
that power and the mind’s power over the body. Descartes mistrust of astrology as a 
science might well have started at a very early age. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis conjectures 
that he was introduced to astrological writings at La Flèche as an exercise by Jean 
François, a young professor there, who later went on to write a treatise against 
astrology.262 However, it is still not precisely clear what philosophical grounding 
Descartes might be using to ground this position. Let us first sketch out what I take to be 
the most obvious response to this question, relating the potential answer to the 
revolutionary changes he brought about in his theory of causation, then examine just 
how some of Descartes’s most prominent followers explicitly attacked the science of 
astrology. 
I. Mechanism and Astral Influence 
                                                   
259 Descartes to Elisabeth, 18 May 1645 (AT IV, 201). Cf. Aucante (2006), (2000) and 
Shapin (2000). 
260 Descartes’s Passions of the Soul is very much indebted to his correspondence with 
both Princess Elisabeth and Queen Christina. His emphasis on the power of the mind 
over the body seems to stem from the frequent medical discussions between Elisabeth 
and himself. 
261 For further disparaging remarks on astrology in Descartes’s major works see rule #5 
in Rules for the Direction of the Mind and the Discourse on Method. 
262 Rodis-Lewis (1998, p. 10). Yet, on the other hand, another one of Descartes’s 
influences from a young age, Isaac Beeckman, believed in astrological influence and 
celestial virtue. 
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To understand exactly why Descartes’s could be so obviously taken to be in 
opposition to astrology we need to very briefly examine some of the scholastic theory 
that undergirded astral influence according to the astrology of the time. As is well 
known, in the scholastic philosophy, that Descartes positions himself against, ‘causation’ 
was a fairly complex term, which could be subdivided into four different types: material, 
efficient, formal, and final. Further, the world itself was also subdivided. As is also well 
known, Aristotelian system required a terrestrial sphere, which was corruptible and 
finite, and a celestial sphere, which was immutable and eternal. Because these two 
spheres were fundamentally different in nature, they operated under completely 
different laws unique to themselves. This also allowed for a relationship between 
superior and inferior bodies to be established, which would later be used to justify 
causation between the stars and earth.263 Needless to say, because of their difference in 
the kinds of things they are, not all types of causation between the two were allowed—
efficient causation was, for the most part, among those ruled out.264 Famously, 
Descartes, in what becomes termed as the new mechanical philosophy, mostly discards 
three of the four kinds of causation, leaving himself with only efficient causation to 
explain all the workings of the physical world. Thus, the various phenomena of the 
world are broken down to the simple pushing and pulling of different physical bits of 
matter. This thesis extended to the celestial sphere as well, where, in an act of great 
                                                   
263 Cf. Weill-Parot’s (2010) for an explanation of this relationship in medieval thought, 
specifically Aquinas or Thorndike (1955). See also Rutkin (2002, p. 41-44). 
264 This is an overly simplistic account. There is good reason to believe that “efficient 
causation” for the Cartesian had a significantly different meaning than it did for the 
scholastic; see Tuozzo (2014). This being said, “efficient causation” in the Cartesian 
sense (i.e. only pushing and pullings) seems to indeed be ruled out. 
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scientific frugality, two realms were reduced to one—all governed by the same laws and 
explanations.  
Of course, astrological explanations were often not this simplistic. Much of 
Ptolemaic astrology based astrological influence on Aristotle’s elements as well as their 
four qualities: hot, cold, wet and dry.265 Other philosophers incorporated the terrestrial 
elements as well as celestial influence together to account for a wide variety of 
phenomena, even the existence of fossils.266 Again, however, these types of explanations 
are explicitly ruled out by Descartes, or, at the very minimum, require a reduction to 
size, shape, and motion, which would retain none of the original explanatory power. To 
adequately account for the diversity in astrological positions, however, would go well 
beyond the scope of this paper and there is no sufficient reason to believe that either 
Descartes or his immediate followers who were critical of astrology were very well 
informed of astrology’s governing principles. Thus, taking what we know of Descartes 
and a rudimentary understanding of astrological causes, there were two immediate 
results stemming his new outlook on natural philosophy. First, action at a distance, or 
action between two objects not determined by intermediary substances, was 
unceremoniously drummed out of the scientific realm. Second, anything normally 
deemed ‘occult,’ was equally ruled out, where ‘occult’ is understood as having qualities, 
or virtues, which admit of no natural (non-mechanical) explanation.267 
 So, we can now see two of the seemingly most devastating effects of the new 
mechanical philosophy against astrology. First, and perhaps most importantly, the 
                                                   
265 Bowden (1975 p. 9-12). 
266 See Ariew (2016 p. 37). 
267 For a more nuanced view of how the term ‘occult’ was used, and its shift in meaning 
from the scholastic to the modern period, see: Hutchison (1982). 
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status of the celestial bodies is significantly downgraded. Instead of their influence 
spreading to us through a relationship of superior to inferior bodies, their new role 
leaves them on par with any other body, including terrestrial ones, thus eliminating a 
large part of the wonder surrounding astrological prognostications. Second, and partly 
following from the first, a new problem is introduced: there seems to be no real means 
for the influence of the stars to reach us, given that their traditional means of causation, 
formal causation, is no longer allowed. Given that efficient causation is the only 
acceptable mode of explanation, it would seem to be a bit of a stretch for the stars to be 
able to, as it were, reach the earth physically. While we cannot be sure that Descartes 
actually considered this to be an objection to astrology, as his explicit writing on the 
subject is scant, we can, however, look to the early reception of Cartesian thought where 
this understanding of the new mechanical philosophy as fundamentally undermining 
even the possibility of astrological reasoning seems to be quite well represented. If we 
look at some of the great early Cartesians who worked to further develop Descartes’s 
physical system—namely, Jacques Rohault, Antoine Le Grand, and Pierre-Sylvain 
Régis—we can see that each specifically targeted astrology along these lines in their 
major treatises.268 
II. Early Cartesian Arguments Against Astrology 
 While most of their criticisms of astrological methods are similar, it will be 
helpful to review quickly the principal objections. Rather surprisingly, all three of the 
above mentioned Cartesians accept influence from the stars to be a given, yet that astral 
influence is quite explicitly and prudently regulated to merely the light and heat they 
produce, proportional to their distance from the earth. With the exception of the sun, 
                                                   
268 Le Grand (1694 p. 167-170). Rohault (1723 p. 86).  
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the influence is considered to be negligible due to the great distances between those 
celestial bodies and the earth. A yet more powerful argument targeting the scope of 
astral influence is also consistent throughout the three Cartesians. While the influence 
of stars is considered negligible, if it were not, the influence exerted upon earth must not 
be global, but quite specific to location; it is claimed that astrologers had simply 
disregarded this variable. This argument is supported through varied experiential 
accounts of various people being born under the same stars yet having different fates, 
thus experimentally undermining the explanatory value of astrological prognostications. 
While much of this might strike the modern ear quite favorably, these philosophers are 
rather consistent in denying any celestial influence and even deny the moon having any 
significant influence over the earth.269 Rather oddly, common observational reports of 
the day, including the claim we think true that oysters and some fish are influenced by 
the moon, are summarily denied, and instead the phenomena are given various other 
causes in line with Descartes’s mechanism (i.e., being better nourished during the time 
of the full moon, or mere coincidence).  
Among these three Cartesians, Rohault’s attacks are clearly the most 
sophisticated. As he describes the situation, astrology suffers from two fatal flaws: first, 
there is no clear foundation on which to base the required causal mechanisms; and 
second, there is no clear method to demonstrate that the location of the stars and 
actions are not simply coincidental and not a true case of causation. As Rohault aptly 
puts it,  
                                                   
269 This was Descartes’s position as well. Strictly speaking, in Descartes physics, it is not 
the moon that exerts any force on the earth, but merely the pressure of the subtle matter 
that flows between the moon and the earth. Cf. Aiton (1955). 
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For, as it would be ridiculous to affirm, that Experience shows us, that Socrates’s, 
going out of town, produced thunder, because it was observed to thunder once, at 
the Moment that this Philosopher was got into the Road to go into the Country: 
So likewise it is ridiculous to affirm, that we have the experience, that such a 
particular Constitution of the Stars, produced, for Example, The sickness of a 
Prince, because it was once observ’d, that a Prince was sick, because they were in 
such a disposition. 
270Already, however, we can see a glimmer of light for the astrologer, or at least a clear 
set of criteria for what is required for it to be accepted as a legitimate Cartesian science. 
First, for an explanation of a given phenomena to be accepted, it must be mechanical 
and rely only on efficient causation. Second, there must be a method for either localizing 
an astrological prediction or justifying its global scope. Lastly, the influence must be 
demonstrated to be strong enough to have some quantifiable impact. These challenges 
are exactly what Claude Gadroys set about to conquer, all while using the very system 
Descartes and his followers believed incompatible with an astrological science. 
III. Claude Gadroys: a Cartesian Astrologist 
 Not much is known regarding Gadroys’s life.271 We do know he was born 
sometime around 1642 and died thirty-six years later in 1678. In various historical 
dictionaries272 it is claimed that he was trained in scholastic thought, and his first 
                                                   
270 Rohault (1723 p. 89). 
271 There are a few very brief discussions of Gadroys, the most informative of which are: 
Thorndike (1934), Mouy (1934), and Clarke (1989). The most extensive discussion, 
however, occurs in Bowden (1975). 
272 See, Chaudon, Louis Mayeul, and Antoine-François Delandine. 1786. Nouveau 
Dictionnaire Historique. Vol. 4. Chez G. le Roi; Ladvocat, Jean Baptiste. 1764. 
Dictionnaire Historique-Portatif: Contenant L'Histoire Des Patriarches, Des Princes 
Hebreux, Des Empereurs, Des Rois Et Des Grands Capitaines. Vol. 2. Didot; and 
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publication was a set of “tables pour server à la logique.” He later converted to Cartesian 
thought, for which he remained a staunch advocate until his death. He served as a 
secrétaire under Louis Bazin de Bezons, who later appointed him as director of the army 
hospital in Metz, where he died after contracting some illness from one of the patients 
there. His extant works include a published exchange with M. Castelet regarding the 
nature of the tides, and another exchange with Guillaume Lamy regarding the benefits 
of blood transfusions. His two known books are Le system du monde, selon les trois 
hypothèse published in 1675, and the Discours sur les influences des astres selon les 
principes de M. Descartes. The Discours, which will be the principal focus of this essay, 
was first published in 1671 with a second edition following in 1674; although the only 
difference between the two editions seems to be a subtitle stating, “where it is shown 
that the stars continually emit a matter by which the things that the ancients attributed 
to occult influences are explained.” Along with these published works was reportedly an 
unfinished piece detailing the disagreements between the scholastic philosophy and that 
of the modern, although, sadly, this work was lost. This was reportedly deeply lamented 
by Gadroys’s friend, the great Antoine Arnauld.273  
 The initial reception of the Discours seems to have been quite positive. 
Interestingly, in 1766, the Nouveau Dictionnaire Historique cites Gadroys’s Discours as 
having been “warmly received, as much for its content as for its form;” yet his other 
works are noted as to be consulted rarely, given that they depend upon Descartes’s 
philosophy which had been proven false. Later in a 1786 edition of the same dictionary, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Moréri, Louis. 1717. Le Grand Dictionnaire historique ou mélange curieux de l'histoire 
sacrée et profane. Vol. 5. 
273 This note is found in the 1755 edition of the Dictionnaire Historique Portatif. 
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all of Gadroys’s work is subsumed under the sad adjective, “guère consulté.”274 Opinions 
on this matter seems to have differed, as, strangely enough, an 1830 edition of On the 
Portraits of English Authors on Gardening claims that Gadroys’s Discours “surely 
merits perusal.” 
 The only other documentation that I could find that gives any indication of how 
Gadroys was received in his day are a few brief mentions in the procès-verbaux of the 
Académie des Sciences. In February of 1675 Gadroys’s second book, Le system du 
monde, selon les trois hypothèse, is mentioned, as he is hoping to dedicate it to the 
Académie. Later, in March, his epistle is read and approved by the Académie and 
ultimately appears in Gadroys’s System du monde. The last entry, in April of 1675, notes 
that Gardoys presents his book to the Académie. While not much can be gleaned from 
these brief entries, we can assume Gardoys to be relatively well connected and further 
that his first treatise on the influence of the stars did not in any way put him out of favor 
with the Académie.  
IV. A Mechanical Argument for Astral Influence: Getting the Stars to 
Earth 
 The text of the Discours sur les influences des astres itself is broken up into ten 
chapters, wherein the first five are dedicated to explaining the mechanisms by which the 
stars’ influence can reach the earth, followed by brief discussions of different types of 
effects this influence can have, including on talismans; Gadroys concludes with his own 
thoughts on the role of judicial astrology and horoscopes in the “true astrology.” 
 Gadroys’s strategy to rehabilitate astrology against its critics starts, in good 
Cartesian form, by disregarding all that came before it, although as the book unfurls this 
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seems to be fairly disingenuous.275 Throughout the Discours, Gadroys is quite keen to 
cite as many critics and proponents of astrology as he can.276 He also relies extensively 
on observational reports and common opinions on a great many subjects.277 The most 
central tenet of Gadroys’s system, that we need astral influence to fill an explanatory 
vacancy, is presented without much argument and is more or less taken for granted. 
How else, Gadroys asks rather incredulously, could we account for contagious maladies, 
and diseases in crops?278 However, beyond a variety of such examples and bland 
assertions regarding the efficacy of astral influence, the majority of the work is set about 
establishing a basic framework for just how such phenomena are possible, thus directly 
confronting the objections of his Cartesian contemporaries. To this end, Gadroy finds a 
means for celestial matter to reach earth in none other than Descartes’s own Principles. 
This is of particular interest for several reasons. First, Gadroys wholly adopts efficient 
causation as the means of astral influence arriving on earth, as he claims that it is the 
matter from the stars themselves by which they communicate their influence rather 
than some occult power, thus eschewing a great deal of previous astrological theory. 
Secondly, Descartes’s physics does not offer many possibilities for celestial matter to be 
transferred over such great distances. Thus Gadroys searching in the Principles for a 
means of communication of celestial matter requires a bit more explanation to fully 
appreciate the novelty of his approach.  
                                                   
275 Gardoys (1671) preface. 
276 He is, however, very careful in selecting the passages he cites; the first chapter ends 
with Gadroys citing both Pico della Mirandola and Gassendi, among others, as agreeing 
that it is without dispute that celestial bodies do exert influence on the earth (Gadroys 
(1671, p. 11). 
277 Interestingly, in Gadroys’ published exchange over the cause of the tides, he is 
absolutely unapologetic about blindly relying on authority (in this specific case, 
Giovanni Cassini).  
278 Gadroys (1671, p. 8). 
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In Descartes’s physics, as is well known, the entirety of the physical universe is 
held to be completely full, with no possibility of a vacuum. Therefore, even the planets 
must be floating along in some kind of matter, and, because the only possible causation 
is efficient causation, their motion must be explainable in terms of that matter alone. In 
this completely full world, or plenum, each of the planets’ particular orbits is explained 
by describing a vortex of this swirling subtle matter that surrounds them. However, this 
matter and its interactions must interact in quite specific ways for Descartes’s system to 
function as planned and to account for the accepted observations of the day.279 For 
example, celestial matter is not allowed to exit these vortices at any point, but, according 
to Descartes’s laws of motion and impact, enter through the poles of a vortex and exit 
through the equators. This fact is posited to account for the stability of planetary orbits, 
namely because celestial matter can only enter and exit at certain points, the other areas 
of the vortex actively resist intrusion, thus not allowing other vortices to shift. If this 
were not the case, according to Cartesian physics, there would be no sufficient 
explanation as to why the vortices do not simply combine together into one single 
vortex.280 Therefore, if Descartes were right, the only location on earth where we might 
be able to observe significant astral influence would be at the poles and around the 
equator—an obviously unacceptable result for a practical astrology. Gadroys, however, 
pulls directly from the Principles to show that there must indeed be some transmission 
                                                   
279 Descartes’s view of vortices, while perhaps not as well developed as one might like, 
does seem to take into account a wide variety of possible objections and subtlety. The 
depth of Descartes’s vortex theory is excellently demonstrated in Schuster (2005). 
280 This explanation suffers a great deal of criticism and Cartesians generally struggle to 
account for the permanence of orbits. This culminates in a fairly late but interesting 
work by Charles-Hercule de Keranflech titled l’Hypothèse des petits tourbillons in 1671, 
which posits smaller and smaller vortices in between the larger ones that serve to keep 
them separated. 
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of subtle matter through other points of these vortices by showing an apparent flaw in 
Descartes’s reasoning. In part III of the Principles, Gadroys astutely describes Descartes 
as asserting that celestial matter enters the earth from the area close to the Little Dipper 
and penetrates through the poles of the earth as part of a larger vortex—thus looping 
through the earth as a ring through a bead.281 Descartes’s interest here was to give a 
mechanical explanation as to why the earth continually maintains its axial tilt toward 
the Big Dipper. Yet with this innocuous case Gadroys is able to show that celestial 
matter sent from the Little Dipper must be entering the earth without coming through 
the poles of the solar vortex, in which the earth’s own vortex is contained. This is 
because the enormous celestial hoop that the vortex from the big dipper through the 
earth would trace would need to, according to Descartes’s own system, pass through 
many other vortices that would necessarily not be aligned pole to pole,282 therefore, it 
must be possible for certain types of celestial matter to reach earth. 
With this first very large step, Gadroys is able to appropriate the vast majority of 
Cartesian physics to describe the physical process that allows celestial matter to reach 
the earth, all while only needing to disregard one apparent contradiction regarding 
celestial matter passing through vortices, thus retaining the vast majority of Cartesian 
natural philosophy. However, this alone is not enough to establish a sound Cartesian 
astrology as the Discours sets out to do; what is still needed is an explanation of how the 
celestial matter is able to affect humans on earth in a meaningful way. For this, Gadroys 
                                                   
281 Gadroys (1671 p. 63-55). Descartes, Principles, Part III, art. 155 (AT IXb, p. 199). 
282 Descartes claims that when two vortices are aligned pole to pole, they will collapse 
into one vortex. It is only through adjusting his vortices to be perpendicular to each 
other that Descartes’s picture of the universe is able to get off the ground. 
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again turns to Descartes, but this time, to Cartesian physiology and medicine in The 
Passions of the Soul and L’Homme. 
V. A Mechanical Argument for Astral Influence: Influencing the 
Mind/Body Union 
I have already noted that Descartes puts much emphasis on the power that the 
mind holds over the body, but this is only part of Descartes’s understanding of the very 
tight connection between the mind and body. Naturally, because of this union, there is 
also a great deal of influence that the body holds over the mind. In L’Homme, for 
example, Descartes is quite explicit in explaining exactly how physiological states can 
produce feelings of joy or sadness: 
When the blood travelling in the heart is the most pure and the most subtle, and 
joins to it more easily than normally, it disposes the small nerve that is there in 
such a way that is required to cause the feeling of joy. As for what is required to 
cause the feeling of sadness, it is when the blood has all the contrary 
properties.283 
Other more general personality traits are also explained physiologically here—
specifically, with reference to subtle matter, called animal spirits, that flows through the 
blood and brain. The size, shape, and speed that the animal spirits move are enough to 
cause tranquility of mind, timidity, or kindness.284 Gadroys is all too eager to assimilate 
Descartes’s physiological works into the service of astrology, citing L’Homme at length 
and also drawing heavily from the Passions of the Soul. 
                                                   
283 AT XI, 164-165. 
284 AT XI, 166-167. This passage is cited directly by Gadroys on pages 124-126. Similar 
and more detailed accounts of the various effects of these animal spirits on emotions 
and temperament can be found in part II of the Passions of the Soul. 
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Without researching the opinions of others, I find that the difference in animal 
spirits can easily explain the diversity in inclinations. As the spirits excite in us 
various movements, they give the soul the opportunity to form different 
thoughts.285 
With Descartes’s views on mind-body interaction firmly adopted, it is a very short 
logical jump to show how astral influence can take hold of general personality traits. As 
Gadroys explains, when a particular planet or star comes into dominance, it sends a 
larger concentration of its particular celestial matter through its own particular vortex, 
which, given its particular size, shape, and motion, have various effects on our bodies 
and consequently our minds.286  
 Thus Gadroys has answered the principal objections that were typical among the 
early Cartesians in providing a mechanism by which astral influence can reach earth 
using Descartes’s own principles, and further given a physiological account of how this 
influence and in turn influence the mind body union. Yet, admittedly, these influence 
are quite small, as compared to most other terrestrial influences the body endures. 
Gadroys, however, goes on to bolster his arguments in citing inarguable cases where 
small causes routinely have quite substantial effects.287 At this point, there is little in the 
Cartesian system that can be explicitly used against Gadroys as he has taken what was 
traditionally viewed as an “occult” phenomena and made ample theoretical space for it 
to be naturalized in good Cartesian form. Of course, Gadroys is not able to answer 
Rohault’s objection to astrology, that correlation does not imply causation, but this is 
                                                   
285 Gadroys (1671 p. 119). 
286 Gadroys (1671 p. 151-185). 
287 Gadroys (1671 p. 77) brings up the example of a particular cloud formation, which 
starts quite small, descends, and then spreads out to great effect. 
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simply not Gadroys goal in this essay. He is quite explicit that he contents himself to 
have described the foundation and leaves it to others to carry out the necessary 
observations and experiments to fully complete a true astrological science.288  
VI. Cartesian Limitations: Free Will and Causal Interference 
Up to this point we have seen a fairly ingenious and comprehensive take on 
Descartes’s natural philosophy to answer some of the major objections against 
astrology. Gadroys has provided, in a fair amount of detail, a reasoned mechanism for 
not only how the stars’ influence can reach earth, but also a physiological account of how 
that influence can actually have substantial effects on us. All this seems quite in line for 
Gadroys to eventually accept the practicality of judiciary astrology and to pave a way for 
a true science of horoscopes and the like. However, in the final chapter of the Discours, 
Gadroys shows immense restraint and moves away from Descartes’s natural philosophy 
to delve into his metaphysics as well. Returning to an objection from Aquinas addressed 
earlier in Gadroys’s Discours, he meets head-on the paradoxical nature of the free will in 
the face of what appears to be a deterministic physics and a mechanistic system of astral 
influence acting on the body and then, necessarily, the mind. Descartes, quite famously, 
asserts that despite the implications of his mechanistic physics, free will is a fact that we 
all clearly experience, thus have no need of rigorous proof to fully accept. Even if reason 
and experience lead us to a deterministic physics, free will simply cannot be denied; 
Gadroys agrees. This being the case, according to Gadroys, the scope of any true 
astrology cannot be absolute. Further, if astrology were able to determine the fate of 
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mankind, morality would be destroyed, as no one would be either praiseworthy or 
blameworthy—an unacceptable result.289  
 Continuing to acknowledge the force of arguments against astrology, Gadroys 
admits that astral influence is no different than any other influence that can be found on 
earth, thus accepting the general Cartesian objection discussed above. 
 Human nature is so supple, so malleable, and so susceptible to diverse forms, 
that in the course of our life the example of a friend, meeting a single man, can 
incline us to good or evil.290 
Noting the equal causal powers of our everyday surroundings and the stars, Gadroys 
again restricts astrology’s reach, while still carving out a space for it among acceptable 
Cartesian explanations. Gadroys asserts that our actions are dependent on three things: 
God, our will, and other beings, where stars and planets are contained in the third 
category. Here, Gadroys, as an astute reader of Descartes, goes beyond what he found in 
his works and attempts to develop the Cartesian tension between free will and a 
deterministic physics further than Descartes had ever attempted, allowing influence 
without any necessary causation.  
Given the complex network of causal interactions, Gadroys makes what 
surprisingly seems to be one of the strongest claim against astrological predictions from 
any Cartesian: “Thus it is a criminal temerity to pretend to pierce the thick clouds of the 
future: our eyes are too weak, and time is a veil too obscure.”291 However, again, 
claiming this inherent complexity in nature and the weakness of our own abilities to 
comprehend it all is not to say that astrology has no place at all in science tout court—
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290 Gadroys (1671 p. 202). 
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quite to the contrary, it is claimed to be a very rich area for further research.292 The 
purpose of a true science of astrology, therefore, is to generate weak and general 
judgments, knowing full well that they hold no absolute certainty over our actions.293 
This, of course, does not exclude astrology from the realm of science, understood as a 
Cartesian, instead it merely limits it to a morally certain science, which, after all, 
constitutes the vast majority of Descartes’s own Principles. 
What then can we take away from this curious case of Claude Gadroys? One thing 
is certain: when Descartes claimed in the French edition of his Principles that he could 
explain how wounds could be caused to bleed when the murderer approached, 
precognition, or other such rare marvels, with his basic principles alone, he opened the 
door for a wide variety of seemingly occult phenomena becoming naturalized.294 
Astrology, so it seemed, had this door opened to it as well. As is noted in Bayle’s 
Nouvelle de la République des lettres: 
Who would have believed that the philosophy of Mr. Descartes, which was the 
bane of superstitions, should be the best support for astrologers and enchanters? 
Mr. Gadrois, a good Cartesian, has already shown that there is no system more 
favorable to astrology than that of Mr. Descartes.295 
Indeed, Gadroys’s Cartesian defense of astrology seems to have given the subject the 
cutting edge scientific background it so desperately needed to rehabilitate itself. 
However, Gadroys’s work seems, despite its ingenuity, to have had no substantial 
impact that I could find, and being so closely intertwined with Descartes’s own physics, 
                                                   
292 Gadroys (1671 p. 218). 
293 Gadroys (1671 p. 214-215). 
294 Principles, Part IV, art. 187 (AT IXb, p. 308). 
295 Nouvelle de la République des lettres April, 1686: 426. 
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suffered the same unfortunate fate. In that same light, however, I can think of no better 
embodiment of Pierre Daniel Huet’s objection that Descartes’s system proves too 
much.296 
If you were to ask Descartes how Saturn comes to have a great circle that is 
detached from Saturn surrounding it, he would first derive the cause of this effect 
from the great store of causes he had prepared. But these causes are such that you 
could conclude that all the other planets should be surrounded in similar rings.297 
Indeed, because Descartes’s system was designed first to set the foundation for possible 
scientific explanations and only after experiment to determine which explanation is in 
fact correct, this objection might well have been seen as a novel feature by Descartes and 
Gadroys. However, in the end, Gadroys, in good Cartesian form, describes only the 
foundation and refuses to follow through with the experimentation and observation 
required to adequately ground his theory, thus he reduces his work to a curious tale in 
the extremes of Cartesianism. 
  
                                                   
296 These types of objections were not uncommon, see Roux (2008). 
297 Régis and Huet (1691 p. 303). 
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